Distance Bounding Protocols: Authentication Logic Analysis and Collusion Attacks

Abstract

Summary. In this paper we consider the problem of securely measuring distance between two nodes in a wireless sensor network. The problem of measuring distance has fundamental applications in both localization and time synchronization, and thus would be a prime candidate for subversion by hostile attackers. We give a brief overview and history of protocols for secure distance bounding. We also give the first full-scale formal analysis of a distance bounding protocol, and we also show how this analysis helps us to reduce message and cryptographic complexity without reducing security. Finally, we address the important open problem of collusion. We analyze existing techniques for collusion prevention, and show how they are inadequate for addressing the collusion problems in sensor networks. We conclude with some suggestions for further research.

Towards provable secure neighbor discovery in wireless networks

“…First, the Brands-Chaum protocol uses commitments and an XOR operation; although the XOR operation is modeled in [17], it cannot be used as it is in the Brands-Chaum protocol. More important, the BrandsChaum protocol includes a rapid-bit-exchange (RBE) phase, during which nodes exchange single, fresh bits.…”

“…We mention works focusing on the security of routing [19,2,20,32], local area networking [13], or broadcast authentication [12]. Closer to our work, the problem of DB has been treated formally in [17] by Meadows et al Their paper is concerned with distance estimation rather than ND, but more importantly, the approach is different. The authors of [17] build on top of existing formal approaches [6,22] tailored for "classical" security protocols, and augments it with a notion of distance based on time-stamps.…”

“…Closer to our work, the problem of DB has been treated formally in [17] by Meadows et al Their paper is concerned with distance estimation rather than ND, but more importantly, the approach is different. The authors of [17] build on top of existing formal approaches [6,22] tailored for "classical" security protocols, and augments it with a notion of distance based on time-stamps. However, it is not clear how neighborhood would be defined in this framework, nor how to model a protocol that uses location information, such as P CR/TL .…”

Effectiveness of distance-decreasing attacks against impulse radio ranging

“…Secure ranging (distance bounding) protocols [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13] are, in general, developed without a particular physical layer in mind. Essentially, they are cryptographic protocols built on top of "traditional" ranging that measures the distance between two devices based on message time-of-flight (Fig.…”

“…Secure ranging [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13] allows a (wireless) device to estimate, in a secure manner, the distance from itself to another device. More specifically, the measured distance provides an upper-bound on the actual distance (hence the name distance bounding used by many authors), even if the protocol is executed in the presence of an adversary that is trying to inPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page.…”