Distinct electrophysiological potentials for intention in action and prior intention for action

Vinding, Mikkel C.; Jensen, Mads; Overgaard, Morten

doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2013.09.001

Cited by 21 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 79 publications

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“…Whether to commit this intention can be determined by a final decision process. c o r t e x 6 5 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 4 9 e1 5 8 intention to act even without immediate movement execution (Jo, Wittmann, Borghardt, et al, 2014;Vinding, Jensen, & Overgaard, 2014). Furthermore, voluntary actions that were following the subjective experience of intention resulted in higher RP amplitude as compared to the actions that were performed during the absence of intention experience (Jo, Wittmann, Borghardt, et al, 2014;Keller & Heckhausen, 1990).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…The ethics committee of the University Medical Center Freiburg approved of this study and written informed consent was obtained from all participants. The 14 item short form of the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI, Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmü ller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006) was administered to assess the level of selfreported mindfulness. It has a two-dimensional structure with the factor "presence" referring to the ability to attend to the present moment and the factor "acceptance" referring to a non-judgmental attitude (Kohls, Sauer, & Walach, 2009).…”

Section: Participantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Do meditators have higher awareness of their intentions to act?

Hinterberger²,

Wittmann

et al. 2015

Cortex

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Participantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do meditators have higher awareness of their intentions to act?

Hinterberger²,

Wittmann

et al. 2015

Cortex

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“…The latter is prevalent in philosophy of mind (Bratman 1987;Pacherie 2008;Searle 1983), and-either explicitly or implicitly-in cognitive psychology and neuroscience Lafargue and Duffau 2008;Lau et al 2004;Quian Quiroga et al 2006;Sirigu et al 2004;Vinding et al 2014). Here we will challenge this latter notion by arguing that the neural mechanisms of action generation and control that are currently known are not compatible with the idea of discrete localizable states as the causes of action (see also ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 89%

Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action

Schurger

Uithol

2015

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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The idea that intentions make the difference between voluntary and nonvoluntary behaviors is simple and intuitive. At the same time, we lack an understanding of how voluntary actions actually come about, and the unquestioned appeal to intentions as discrete causes of actions offers little if anything in the way of an answer. We cite evidence suggesting that the origin of actions varies depending on context and effector, and argue that actions emerge from a causal web in the brain, rather than a central origin of intentional action. We argue that this causal web need not be confined to the central nervous system, and that proprioceptive feedback might play a counterintuitive role in the decision process. Finally we argue that the complex and dynamic origins of voluntary action and their interplay with the brain's propensity to predict the immediate future are better studied using a dynamical systems approach.

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“…A few studies have investigated the difference between proximal intentions and delayed intentions (Vinding et al, 2013, 2014) 1 . Participants were instructed to either act immediately, or wait a certain time-interval before acting, when they experienced the intention to act.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In previous experiments, a fixed intermediate delay was used between the time, intentions were formed, and the time, the intentions were realized into actions (Vinding et al, 2013, 2014). It was not addressed if the effect of delayed intentions changed as a consequence of the delay period per se .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The time between intention and action affects the experience of action

Vinding

Jensen

Overgaard

2015

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

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We present a study investigating how the delay between the intention to act and the following action, influenced the experience of action. In experiments investigating sense of agency and experience of action, the contrast is most often between voluntary and involuntary actions. It is rarely asked whether different types of intentions influence the experience of action differently. To investigate this we distinguished between proximal intentions (i.e., intentions for immediate actions) and delayed intentions (i.e., intentions with a temporal delay between intention and action). The distinction was implemented in an intentional binding paradigm, by varying the delay between the time where participants formed the intention to act and the time at which they performed the action. The results showed that delayed intentions were followed by a stronger binding effect for the tone following the action compared to proximal intentions. The actions were reported to have occurred earlier for delayed intentions than for proximal intentions. This effect was independent of the binding effect usually found in intentional binding experiments. This suggests that two perceptual shifts occurred in the contrast between delayed intentions and proximal intentions: The first being the binding effect, the second a general shift in the perceived time of action. Neither the stronger binding effect for tone, nor the earlier reports of action, differed across delays for delayed intentions. The results imply that delayed intentions and proximal intentions have a different impact on the experience of action.

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Distinct electrophysiological potentials for intention in action and prior intention for action

Cited by 21 publications

References 79 publications

Do meditators have higher awareness of their intentions to act?

Do meditators have higher awareness of their intentions to act?

Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action

The time between intention and action affects the experience of action

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