Distinguishing Explanatory from Nonexplanatory Fictions

Abstract

There is a growing recognition that fictions have a number of legitimate functions in science, even when it comes to scientific explanation. However, the question then arises, what distinguishes an explanatory fiction from a nonexplanatory one? Here I examine two cases—one in which there is a consensus in the scientific community that the fiction is explanatory and another in which the fiction is not explanatory. I shall show how my account of “model explanations” is able to explain this asymmetry, and argue that realism—of a more subtle form—does have a role in distinguishing explanatory from nonexplanatory fictions.

Fiction As a Vehicle for Truth: Moving Beyond the Ontic Conception

“…Moreover, in many cases, these fictions seem to play an explanatory role (e.g., Batterman 2009;Bokulich 2008aBokulich , 2008bBokulich , 2009Bokulich , 2012Weiskopf 2011). This use of fictional posits in scientific explanation runs counter to the received view of scientific explanation, according to which only true accounts and existing entities, processes, etc.…”

“…Elsewhere I have raised some doubts about whether such a quarantining is possible (e.g., Bokulich 2008bBokulich , 2009Bokulich , 2012. My aim here, however, is to critically engage the underlying assumption about the nature of explanation that implicitly or explicitly drives these intuitions that fictions cannot explain.…”

“…As Elgin further argues, fictions can "highlight certain aspects of the phenomena, reveal connections, patterns and discrepancies, and make possible insights that we could not otherwise obtain" (Elgin 2004, p. 127;see also Elgin 2007, p. 39). Obviously not just any fiction will do, and elsewhere I have suggested an approach for how one might go about distinguishing explanatory from non-explanatory fictions (Bokulich 2012).…”

“…Elsewhere I have discussed Vaihinger's views in more depth, and defended the view that, pace Vaihinger, fictions do have a role to play in scientific explanation and in advancing genuine understanding (Bokulich 2009). Moreover, I have developed a model-based account of scientific explanation according to which fictions can explain (Bokulich 2008a(Bokulich ,b, 2011(Bokulich , 2012. Lingering doubts have remained, however.…”

On structural accounts of model-explanations

“…In recent work, Alisa Bokulich has argued that idealization has a central role to play in explanation (Bokulich, 2008(Bokulich, , 2011(Bokulich, , 2012. Bokulich claims that certain highly-idealized models are explanatory, even though they are not considered explanatory by causal, mechanistic, or covering law accounts of explanation.…”