Diversity of Institutional Investors and Foreign Blockholdings in France: The Evolution of an Institutionally Hybrid Economy

Goyer, Michel; Jung, Dong Kwan

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00880.x

Cited by 28 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 128 publications

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“…In general, foreign ownership of French firms increased significantly, from 10 percent of total equity in 1985 to 35 percent in 1997 (Clift, ). According to Goyer and Jung (: 563), France represents an institutionally “hybrid” economy, the largest representative of institutionally hybrid, developed, economies. This type of economy is “highly interesting for the analysis of the strategy of international investment by UK/US‐based institutional investors,” given that its “hybrid” character was instrumental in attracting Anglo‐American funds.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A possible further differentiation of Anglo‐American institutional investors would be one based on their temporal orientation, i.e., long term vs. short term (see, e.g., Goyer & Jung, ). For instance, Goyer and Jung () proceed to such differentiation with the use of a dichotomous variable based on the median turnover rate of investors. In our study, we were unable to systematically differentiate the Anglo‐American institutional investor category based on a categorization of their activity as (exclusively) long‐term‐oriented vs. short‐term‐oriented.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Who Drives Corporate Restructuring? Co‐Existing Owners in French Firms

Kavadis¹,

Castañer²

2015

Corporate Governance

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Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This study aims to explain who drives corporate restructuring, after a period of important corporate governance changes in France, and where the respective role of Anglo‐American institutional investors and domestic family owners have been the object of debate. Research Findings/Insights Using extensive longitudinal data from French publicly‐listed firms during the 2000–2007 period, we find that domestic family ownership is positively related to restructuring. This effect is magnified under conditions of high Anglo‐American institutional investor ownership and poor firm performance. We also find that restructuring improves subsequent firm performance. Theoretical/Academic Implications We contribute to corporate governance research on family firms with a contingent framework about the relative influence of different types of owners with supposedly different value systems and preferences on restructuring. Domestic family owners, even from a country where shareholder value maximization is not historically preeminent, promote restructuring. In contrast, the influence of Anglo‐American institutional investors is indirect: the more they are present in the firm's capital, the more French family owners will further support restructuring, as a means to preserve their socio‐emotional wealth. Anglo‐American institutional investor influence on French family owners is further accentuated under conditions of poor firm performance. Practitioner/Policy Implications Practitioners and, in particular, (potential and current) owners can use our findings to reflect on the implications for corporate decisions of the relative presence of different owners coming from different institutional environments and thus with potentially different objectives. Our results may also be informative to policy makers to further enhance effective regulation.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Drives Corporate Restructuring? Co‐Existing Owners in French Firms

Kavadis¹,

Castañer²

2015

Corporate Governance

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“…In multinational firm context, it is hard for foreign shareholders to monitor managerial decision because of complexity of corporate structure with many foreign subsidiaries across country (S. . Not only foreign manager have adaptation difficulty in domestic environment, but domestic manager as well have adaptation difficulty in firm where foreign shareholders have brought foreign atmosphere in some business activities, for example, research by Goyer & Jung (2011) found that social capital domestic CEO could reduce foreign ownership because of foreign atmosphere in some business activities. Those…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Not only foreign manager have adaptation difficulty in domestic environment, but domestic manager as well have adaptation difficulty in firm where foreign shareholders have brought foreign atmosphere in some business activities. Goyer & Jung (2011) found that social capital domestic CEO could reduce foreign ownership.…”

Section: Corporate Governance Foreign Ownership and Firm Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

Moderating role of firms’ rank in ASEAN corporate governance scorecard on effect of foreign ownership on firm value

Justina¹,

Simamora²

2017

JSB

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This research is aimed to examine moderating role of firms' rank in ASEAN corporate governance scorecard on effect of foreign ownership on firm value in ASEAN. Research sample consists of 491 manufacture firms listed in stock market of Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia from 2012-2013. With regression analysis, this research finds that big 50 of highest ASEAN corporate governance scorecard rank moderates effect of foreign ownership on firm value in ASEAN. High ASEAN corporate governance scorecard; as improvement of rights of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, responsibilities of the board; supports foreign shareholder role in firm value increasing. Management could make firm policy about optimal foreign ownership structure as well as optimal corporate governance, so management could maximizes shareholders wealth by firm value increasing. Investors, who have interest send their investment abroad especially in ASEAN, have to see condition of corporate governance, so investors' wealth could be maximized.Keywords: ASEAN corporate governance scorecard, foreign ownership, firm value. Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia tahun 2012-2013 Abstrak Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji peringkat perusahaan berdasarkan ASEAN corporate governance scorecard, sebagai variabel pemoderasi, atas pengaruh kepemilikan asing terhadap nilai perusahaan di ASEAN. Sample penelitian terdiri dari 491 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di pasar modal

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“…Institutions, like codes, are important but do not strictly determine behavior, even when they reduce the range of available strategic options. Strategic choice remains possible as a firm's stakeholders constitute sub‐groups with different interests and incentives that affect how they operate in an institutional framework (Aguilera & Jackson, ; Goyer & Jung, ). In the UK, this is even more so because the institutions are self‐regulatory.…”

Section: A Political Perspective On Business Elites and Institutionalmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Political Perspective on Business Elites and Institutional Embeddedness in theUKCode‐Issuing Process

Haxhi¹,

Ees²,

Sorge³

2013

Corporate Governance

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Manuscript Type Perspective Research Question/Issue What is the role of institutional actors and business elites in the development of UK corporate governance codes? In the current paper, we explore the UK code‐issuing process by focusing on the UK actors, their power and interplay. Research Findings/Insights Our findings indicate, first, that the comply‐or‐explain principle, intertwined with the rich issuance of codes, reflects the diversity and permissiveness of British society and its ability to absorb contested corporate practices in a way that manages to preserve the status quo. Second, the UK business elites preserve their position in the corporate arena by using the principle of good governance, including the possibility to deviate from best practices, as an instrument of neutralizing institutional change. Third, the UK institutional and societal embeddedness gives carte blanche to elites to use corporate governance practices to serve their own interest. Theoretical/Academic Implications By emphasizing the strategic behavior of business elites embedded in the UK institutional configuration, we offer a political perspective on the national contextuality of the code‐issuing process. The worldwide diffusion of codes should not dissimulate their cross‐national contested nature. Codes reflect potential redistribution of power among institutional actors and business elites as well as the struggle over corporate resources between corporate actors (i.e., shareholders and managers) in maintaining their status quo. Practitioner/Policy Implications Practitioners should perceive codes as having different meanings depending on national contexts and national political constituencies. Codes reflect constellations of actors such as managers, shareholders, regulators and others, whose approach to codes and strategic interests are at least as important to know and understand as the verbatim content of codes.

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Diversity of Institutional Investors and Foreign Blockholdings in France: The Evolution of an Institutionally Hybrid Economy

Abstract: Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: What are some of the key factors that facilitate/constrain the acquisition of concentrated equity stakes (>5 per cent) by Anglo-American institutional investors in French companies?

Cited by 28 publications

References 128 publications

Who Drives Corporate Restructuring? Co‐Existing Owners in French Firms

Who Drives Corporate Restructuring? Co‐Existing Owners in French Firms

Moderating role of firms’ rank in ASEAN corporate governance scorecard on effect of foreign ownership on firm value

A Political Perspective on Business Elites and Institutional Embeddedness in theUKCode‐Issuing Process

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