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Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This study aims to explain who drives corporate restructuring, after a period of important corporate governance changes in France, and where the respective role of Anglo‐American institutional investors and domestic family owners have been the object of debate. Research Findings/Insights Using extensive longitudinal data from French publicly‐listed firms during the 2000–2007 period, we find that domestic family ownership is positively related to restructuring. This effect is magnified under conditions of high Anglo‐American institutional investor ownership and poor firm performance. We also find that restructuring improves subsequent firm performance. Theoretical/Academic Implications We contribute to corporate governance research on family firms with a contingent framework about the relative influence of different types of owners with supposedly different value systems and preferences on restructuring. Domestic family owners, even from a country where shareholder value maximization is not historically preeminent, promote restructuring. In contrast, the influence of Anglo‐American institutional investors is indirect: the more they are present in the firm's capital, the more French family owners will further support restructuring, as a means to preserve their socio‐emotional wealth. Anglo‐American institutional investor influence on French family owners is further accentuated under conditions of poor firm performance. Practitioner/Policy Implications Practitioners and, in particular, (potential and current) owners can use our findings to reflect on the implications for corporate decisions of the relative presence of different owners coming from different institutional environments and thus with potentially different objectives. Our results may also be informative to policy makers to further enhance effective regulation.

Research Question/Issue Short‐termism is increasingly seen as a problem for developing sustainable and responsible business. We posit that a long‐term ownership horizon is an enabling but not sufficient condition for sustainability and propose owner stewardship as an important contingency. Research Findings/Insights We review 161 articles on the relationship between corporate ownership and sustainability/CSR, published during 2017–2021 and not covered by previous reviews. We find (1) in most cases, a positive effect of institutional ownership on sustainability, particularly for long‐term institutional investors; (2) in most cases, a positive effect of state ownership, seen as long‐term‐oriented; and (3) mixed results regarding family ownership, also seen as long‐term‐oriented. We also observe considerable heterogeneity in how prior research defines and measures the key constructs of our review. Theoretical/Academic Implications Long‐term ownership appears to be an enabling but not sufficient condition for corporate sustainability, and stewardship at the ownership level may be an important missing link. Furthermore, the wide variety of terminology and measures in the literature poses a challenge for knowledge accumulation. Efforts towards convergence and standardization seem important. Practitioner/Policy Implications An exclusive focus on short‐termism may be misleading. Business leaders and policymakers ought to consider other parameters, such as steward ownership.

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Hostile takeover attempts are considered a key external governance mechanism aimed at addressing perceived managerial underperformance in a target firm. Studies show that target chief executive officers (CEOs) are usually dismissed shortly after a takeover attempt, regardless of whether the bidder actually completes the acquisition. Yet, little is known about the investment behaviors of target CEOs who actually retain their positions in the wake of an unsuccessful hostile takeover attempt. Engaging with this underexplored governance context, we advance a behaviorally informed model of CEO investment behaviors in response to external governance as a function of the negative performance feedback event of the takeover attempt and the timing of the market’s attempt in terms of the stage of the target CEO’s tenure. Based on a matched-pair study of 71 failed takeover attempts from 1995 to 2006, we find evidence of a nonlinear relation between target CEO tenure and degree of uncertainty of expected returns in subsequent strategic investments in the wake of a failed hostile takeover attempt. We discuss the implications for research on external governance, behavioral agency, and executives’ influences on firm processes and outcomes.