2014
DOI: 10.1108/s0742-332220140000031007
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Ownership Effects on Unrelated Diversification: An Institutions’ Perspective

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Cited by 14 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…Further, we include the role of owners' institutional origin, and show that owner institutional origin matters in terms of impact on corporate restructuring. Hence, we contribute to research that has elaborated on the differing motives and behaviors of various types of owners (e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2003;Kavadis & Castañer, 2014), and that firm-level outcomes are likely to result from the interaction of different actors (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010;Goyer, 2007;Jackson, 2005;Jung et al, 2014).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Further, we include the role of owners' institutional origin, and show that owner institutional origin matters in terms of impact on corporate restructuring. Hence, we contribute to research that has elaborated on the differing motives and behaviors of various types of owners (e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2003;Kavadis & Castañer, 2014), and that firm-level outcomes are likely to result from the interaction of different actors (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010;Goyer, 2007;Jackson, 2005;Jung et al, 2014).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They have an indirect effect with regard to explaining restructuring costs in firms with family owners and/or family CEOs. Anglo‐American owners may well have direct effects in publicly‐listed firms in general with regard to specific decisions of corporate strategy, such as business and geographic diversification, divestments, and business exits (e.g., Goyer, ; Kavadis & Castañer, ; Morin, ).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Empirical evidence underlines the wide diversity of individual and organizational ownership with respect to the type, such as founder, family, corporate, governmental and institutional (Aguilera, Talaulicar, Chung, Jimenez, & Goel, ; Tihanyi et al, ; Wood & Wright, ), portfolio characteristics of the investor (Bushee, ; Goranova, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, ), activism propensity (Goranova, Abouk, Nystrom, & Soofi, ), or the country of institutional origin (Kavadis & Castañer, ; La Porta, López‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, ; Zattoni & Judge, ). Furthermore, prior research finds that different types of organizational owners differ in their monitoring effectiveness (Davis & Kim, ; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, ) and in their pursuit of financial versus non‐financial goals (e.g., Gómez‐Mejía, Takacs‐Haynes, Nuñez‐Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyanto‐Fuentes, ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, differences in terms of the institutional context from which shareholders originate have been shown to affect governance issues, such as the focus on shareholder value maximization (Fiss & Zajac, ) and the use of independent auditors (Desender, Aguilera, López Puertas‐Lamy, & Crespí, ), as well as organizational structure (Zattoni, ), corporate refocusing (David, O'Brien, Yoshikawa, & Delios, ; Kavadis & Castañer, ), restructuring (Ahmadjian & Robinson, ; Kavadis & Castañer, ), and internationalization (Filatotchev, Stephan, & Jindra, ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Empirical evidence underlines the wide diversity of individual and organizational ownership with respect to the type, such as founder, family, corporate, governmental and institutional (Aguilera, Talaulicar, Chung, Jimenez, & Goel, ; Tihanyi et al, ; Wood & Wright, ), portfolio characteristics of the investor (Bushee, ; Goranova, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, ), activism propensity (Goranova, Abouk, Nystrom, & Soofi, ), or the country of institutional origin (Kavadis & Castañer, ; La Porta, López‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, ; Zattoni & Judge, ). Furthermore, prior research finds that different types of organizational owners differ in their monitoring effectiveness (Davis & Kim, ; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, ) and in their pursuit of financial versus non‐financial goals (e.g., Gómez‐Mejía, Takacs‐Haynes, Nuñez‐Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyanto‐Fuentes, ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%