Divided We Govern? A Reassessment

Kelly, Sean Q.

doi:10.2307/3234975

Cited by 93 publications

(82 citation statements)

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“…This paradoxical finding of a strong veto-potential and a lack of clear evidence of its frequent use has led to contradictory assessments of the consequences of divided government (Benz 1985;Lehmbruch 2000;Sachs 1999;Scharpf 1988Scharpf , 2005. A similar controversy, fueled by the very same problems to pin down the legislative effects of divided government empirically, has arisen in the United States political science literature (Binder 1999;Coleman 1999;Cox and Kernell 1991;Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997;Fiorina 1996;Howell et al 2000;Jones 1994;Kelly 1993;Krehbiel 1996;Mayhew 1991;Quirk and Nesmith 2000;Sundquist 1988). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Legislative Self‐Restraint Under Divided Government In Germany, 1976–2002

Manow

Burkhart

2007

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Using the Vanberg (1998) model of legislative autolimitation from the judicial review literature, we investigated the impact of divided government on the strategic choices of government and opposition. The main prediction of the model is that a strong opposition dominance in the second chamber (Bundesrat) usually does not lead to open party-political conflict, but rather to a government's legislative selfrestraint. We tested the hypotheses following from the model on a detailed dataset comprising all legislative bills in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The results show that the main effects of divided government are, in fact, indirect and anticipatory. We conclude that when majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat diverge, the impact on legislation is substantial.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Legislative Self‐Restraint Under Divided Government In Germany, 1976–2002

Manow

Burkhart

2007

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…For example, based on an evaluation of legislative action, Kelly (1993) concluded that the production of important legislation is more likely in a unified government (conditions of political harmony). Coleman (1999) extended the analysis of legislative activity and found that unified, relative to divided, government produces one to two more significant enactments per congressional session, blocks approximately ten fewer potentially significant bills, and greatly increases the percentage of important bills that become law.…”

Section: Political Gridlock and Economic Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gridlock’s Gone, Now What?

Beyer

Jensen²,

Johnson

2006

Financial Analysts Journal

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“…En este sentido, los estudios se han enfocado en saber si los gobiernos divididos 4 afectan aspectos como la productividad legislativa y la función de control del congreso. En el caso de Estados Unidos, de donde proviene la mayor parte de las investigaciones, son más los estudios que demuestran que el gobierno dividido sí tiene un efecto sobre la productividad legislativa (Binder, 1999;Coleman, 1999;Cox y McCubbins, 1991;Edwards, Barrett y Peake, 1997;Howell et al, 2000;Kelly, 1993;McCubbins, 1991) que aquellos que muestran lo contrario (Mayhew, 1991).…”

Section: Los Efectos Del Gobierno Divididounclassified

El congreso y la política de gasto en Jalisco, 1990-2014

Martínez¹

2016

Estud. Sociol.

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ResumenLos estudios sobre la política subnacional destacan el amplio poder de los gobernadores y la debilidad de los congresos locales, aspectos que persisten en la política de gasto. Sin embargo, consideramos que es preciso mostrar evidencia sobre la actividad de los congresos para tener una imagen más exacta de esta relación. Con base en el estudio de caso de Jalisco, los objetivos de esta investigación son: a) mostrar evidencia empírica sobre el ejercicio de la función presupuestaria; b) explorar si el estatus del gobierno afecta la conducta del congreso y su relación con el Ejecutivo y; c) conocer el impacto de las enmiendas sobre el contenido del presupuesto de egresos.Palabras clave: congreso local; política de gasto; gobierno dividido/unificado; relación Ejecutivo-Legislativo. Abstract Congress and budget policy in Jalisco, 1990-2014Subnational studies in Mexico have pointed out the huge power of governors and the weakness of local Congresses in the design of budget policy. However, it is important to provide more evidence on the Congresses's performance to attain a better understanding of this situation. Based on a case study of the Mexican state of Jalisco, 1 Este artículo forma parte de la investigación de doctorado del autor, la cual analiza la función presupuestaria para todos los congresos estatales en el periodo 2000-2012. 537

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Divided We Govern? A Reassessment

Cited by 93 publications

References 0 publications

Legislative Self‐Restraint Under Divided Government In Germany, 1976–2002

Legislative Self‐Restraint Under Divided Government In Germany, 1976–2002

Gridlock’s Gone, Now What?

El congreso y la política de gasto en Jalisco, 1990-2014

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