Dividing the Spoils of Power: How Are the Benefits of Majority Party Status Distributed in U.S. State Legislatures?

Abstract

We assess the conditions under which majority status generates benefits for incumbent legislators and how these benefits are distributed among members of the majority party. We argue that majority status is valuable only in procedurally partisan chambers; that is, when the majority party monopolizes chamber leadership positions and control of the legislative agenda. Contrary to the existing literature, we also posit that these rewards should be distributed broadly across the majority party. To test our expectations, we utilize 10 recent transitions in the partisan control of U.S. state legislatures and data on campaign contributions. Consistent with our expectations, majority status is valuable, but only in procedurally partisan chambers. Furthermore, the premium in campaign contributions enjoyed by the majority party is primarily distributed to backbenchers, although top party leaders also benefit. These results provide important insights into the distribution of power and influence in U.S. state legislatures.despite the large number of scholarly articles and books devoted to evaluating partisan theories of legislative organization, little attention has been paid to the implications of chamber-wide majority party advantage at the level of individual legislators. The existing literature has focused on whether the majority party collectively enjoys substantial advantages in the legislative process, not who in the majority party benefits (Cox and McCubbins 1993;Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins 2005;Aldrich 1995). Do these benefits accrue exclusively to majority party leaders or to individual members outside of the party leadership? What are the relative magnitudes of these benefits? What conditions determine their distribution?This article addresses these questions in the setting of U.S. state legislatures. In particular, we examine whether and how donors reallocate their campaign giving following an intra-chamber change in the identity of the at SEATTLE UNIV LIBRARY on June 29, 2015 spa.sagepub.com Downloaded from

The Redistricting Cycle, Partisan Tides, and Party Strategy in State Legislative Elections

“…Although redistricting is an important power the majority party possesses once a decade, majority party legislators in every session may have policy, power, and fund-raising advantages. While some work (e.g., Kim and Phillips 2009) has attempted to quantify the value of majority party status, their conclusions are limited to a small number of states and a narrow definition of value.…”

“… 2. This study focuses on the value of majority party status as it relates to control of the redistricting process. However, the value may differ across states in a variety of ways, including the ability to pass policy, the powers of majority party leadership (Clucas 2001), and the ability of members to fund-raise (Kim and Phillips 2009). …”

Subverting the Organizational Cartel: Explaining Cross-Party Leadership Selection in U.S. State Houses

“…A notable exception is Kousser (2005). By contrast, minority governments in other countries have been the subject of a number of scholarly studies (e.g., Cheibub et al, 2004;Strom, 1984), as have other ways that minority parties exercise influence in U.S. state legislatures, such as the right to chair committees or have their bills be considered on the chamber floor (Clark, 2015, p. 12;Kim & Phillips, 2009).…”

The Impact of District Magnitude on Campaign Fundraising

“…Of course, fundraising is influenced by a variety of factors. Incumbents (Gierzynski and Breaux ), legislative leaders (Kim and Phillips ; Romer and Snyder ), and members of the legislative majority (Cox and Magar ; Kim and Phillips ; Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell ) enjoy fundraising advantages. Candidates for open seats also raise more funds (Gierzynski and Breaux ; Hogan and Hamm ; Moncrief ), in part because they spend more time fundraising (Francia et al.…”