No abstract

S ince 1972, campaign spending by House incumbents has skyrocketed, particularly in those districts with marginal support for the incumbent's party. At the same time, parties in the House have become much more cohesive in the way they vote, producing more precise and informative party brands. We argue that these two phenomena are fundamentally linked. As parties have developed more precise reputations, incumbents in these districts must spend much more to attract voters in "marginal" districts, who would be willing to vote for a candidate with the particular incumbent's legislative record, but not the average member of his party. Increasingly precise party reputations provide voters with stronger priors that incumbents are just like the rest of their party, and incumbents in marginal districts must spend more to overcome these beliefs. We demonstrate this using a simple formal model and test it empirically using campaign-spending data from 1972 to 2008.

We assess the conditions under which majority status generates benefits for incumbent legislators and how these benefits are distributed among members of the majority party. We argue that majority status is valuable only in procedurally partisan chambers; that is, when the majority party monopolizes chamber leadership positions and control of the legislative agenda. Contrary to the existing literature, we also posit that these rewards should be distributed broadly across the majority party. To test our expectations, we utilize 10 recent transitions in the partisan control of U.S. state legislatures and data on campaign contributions. Consistent with our expectations, majority status is valuable, but only in procedurally partisan chambers. Furthermore, the premium in campaign contributions enjoyed by the majority party is primarily distributed to backbenchers, although top party leaders also benefit. These results provide important insights into the distribution of power and influence in U.S. state legislatures.despite the large number of scholarly articles and books devoted to evaluating partisan theories of legislative organization, little attention has been paid to the implications of chamber-wide majority party advantage at the level of individual legislators. The existing literature has focused on whether the majority party collectively enjoys substantial advantages in the legislative process, not who in the majority party benefits (Cox and McCubbins 1993;Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins 2005;Aldrich 1995). Do these benefits accrue exclusively to majority party leaders or to individual members outside of the party leadership? What are the relative magnitudes of these benefits? What conditions determine their distribution?This article addresses these questions in the setting of U.S. state legislatures. In particular, we examine whether and how donors reallocate their campaign giving following an intra-chamber change in the identity of the at SEATTLE UNIV LIBRARY on June 29, 2015 spa.sagepub.com Downloaded from

Success in SNTV requires not merely winning but also coordinating votes. Governing parties often reap coordination advantage thanks to their control of the state and its resources. Since governing parties in authoritarian states enjoy greater control over the state and its resources, we argue that they should also enjoy magnified coordinative advantages in SNTV election. Of course, authoritarian regimes often use state resources to win more votes; we argue that, in SNTV, in addition to winning more votes, those votes can also be distributed more effectively. We demonstrate our claims using election data from both local and national SNTV elections in Taiwan from 1954 to 2005.

We argue that party government in the U.S. House of Representatives rests on two pillars: the pursuit of policy goals and the disbursement of particularistic benefits. Existing theories of party government argue that the majority party in the House is often successful in biasing policy outcomes in its favor. In the process, it creates "policy losers" among its own members who nevertheless support their party on procedural votes. We posit that the majority party creates an incentive for even the policy losers to support a procedural coalition through judicious distribution of particularistic benefits that compensates policy losers at a rate commensurate with the policy losses that they suffer. We evaluate our theory empirically using the concept of "roll rates" in conjunction with federal domestic outlays data for the period 1983-96. We find that, within the majority party, policy losers are favored in the distribution of "pork barrel" spending throughout this period.