Do Anti-Poverty Programs Sway Voters? Experimental Evidence from Uganda

Abstract

A Ugandan government program allowed groups of young people to submit proposals to start skilled enterprises. Among 535 eligible proposals, the government randomly selected 265 to receive grants of nearly $400 per person. Blattman et al. (2014) showed that, after four years, the program raised employment by 17% and earnings 38%. This paper shows that, rather than rewarding the government in elections, beneficiaries increased opposition party membership, campaigning, and voting. Higher incomes are associated with opposition support, and we hypothesize that financial independence frees the poor to express political preferences publicly, being less reliant on patronage and other political transfers.

Does relative deprivation condition the effects of social protection programs on political attitudes? Experimental evidence from Pakistan

“…Country Context Dataset Population Gini Index Outcome Measures Effect Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) Germany Flood report (2002), State election and constituency data (1994,1998,2002,2005,2009) All voters 29.2 (1994) Vote share for the incumbent party Positive Blattman, Emeriau, and Fiala (2018) Uganda Baseline and two follow-up survey (2008,2010,2012) Representative sample of applicants to the program 45.2 (2008) Index of presidential support Mixed Brazys, Heaney, and Walsh (2015) Malawi Malawian Welfare Monitoring Survey (2008), Election data (2004,2009) All voters 39.9 (2004) Vote share for the incumbent party Positive Cerda and Vergara (2008) Chile Election data (1989, 1993, and 1999), Survey of Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Chilean Population (1990,1992,1998)…”

Cash transfers' effect on government support: the case of Fiji

“…On the one hand, the 'attentive citizen' theory contends that beneficiaries can react rationally in the wake of a natural hazard and ensuing disaster by inferring government competence or redistributive preferences from its response (Drazen and Eslava, 2010;Lazarev et al, 2014). On the other, solid evidence indicates that even among governments that have distributed disaster aid effectively, the impacts on government support are sometimes inexistent or negative (Larreguy et al, 2015;Heersink et al, 2017;Blattman et al, 2018).…”

Strategic Allocation of Irrevocable and Durable Benefits

“…However, a recent literature on developing countries has uncovered a countervailing policy effect: irrevocable and durable benefits that generate permanent income gains can also break the dependence of voters on incumbents. This is the case of an urban titling program in Mexico (Larreguy, Marshall, and Trucco 2018); water cisterns in Brazil (Bobonis et al 2019); entrepreneurial grants in Uganda (Blattman, Emeriau, and Fiala 2018); or access to financial services in the Philippines (Hite-Rubin 2015).…”

“…This is the case of an urban titling program in Mexico (Larreguy, Marshall, and Trucco 2018); water cisterns in Brazil (Bobonis et al. 2019); entrepreneurial grants in Uganda (Blattman, Emeriau, and Fiala 2018); or access to financial services in the Philippines (Hite‐Rubin 2015).…”