2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2020.101836
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Do Competent Managers Hoard Bad News? Self-regulation Theory and Korean Evidence

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Although firms weigh costs versus benefits in holding cash (Opler et al, 1999), the benefits of cash holdings can be mitigated by agency problems, where managers may use a cash buffer to serve private interests (M. C. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The “dark side” of managerial ability links CEOs to a higher possibility of stock price crash risk attributable to investment inefficiency (Habib & Hasan, 2017), unethical behavior resulting from bad news hoarding (S. Lee et al, 2021), higher agency costs (Mishra, 2014), and opportunistic financial reporting (Gul et al, 2017).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although firms weigh costs versus benefits in holding cash (Opler et al, 1999), the benefits of cash holdings can be mitigated by agency problems, where managers may use a cash buffer to serve private interests (M. C. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The “dark side” of managerial ability links CEOs to a higher possibility of stock price crash risk attributable to investment inefficiency (Habib & Hasan, 2017), unethical behavior resulting from bad news hoarding (S. Lee et al, 2021), higher agency costs (Mishra, 2014), and opportunistic financial reporting (Gul et al, 2017).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to signaling theory, firms or governments disclose information to the outside world, which conveys information to investors, who make decisions based on the information (Karasek & Bryant, 2012;Taj, 2016). Based on bad news hiding theory, corporate managers have an incentive to release positive information, hide negative news, or delay the disclosure of negative news (F. Jiang et al, 2020;Lee et al, 2021). As suggested in stakeholder theory, the attention of external stakeholders to the firm has an impact on the value of the firm (Freeman et al, 2010).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on bad news hiding theory, corporate managers have an incentive to release positive information, hide negative news, or delay the disclosure of negative news (F. Jiang et al, 2020; Lee et al, 2021). As suggested in stakeholder theory, the attention of external stakeholders to the firm has an impact on the value of the firm (Freeman et al, 2010).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Además, las habilidades gerenciales son un vehículo de transferencia de destrezas, a través del cual el talento humano gerencial, plantea acciones estratégicas y pone en prácticas las herramientas administrativas para el éxito de la empresa . Por esta razón, el gerente debe estar provisto de las competencias (Gao et al, 2022;Sun et al, 2019), habilidades, disciplinas y conocimientos que le permitan solucionar problemas, generar nuevas experiencias positivas y beneficios para la empresa (Gunawan et al, 2023;Lee et al, 2021).…”
Section: Introductionunclassified