This paper investigates whether chaebol firms tend to issue corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports more than non-chaebol firms. Based on previous studies documenting chaebols’ tunneling activities at the expense of other shareholders, we anticipate that chaebol firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose their CSR reports even if investors may discount their values because CSR disclosure is an effective means of window dressing. The empirical results support our expectations. We find that chaebol firms are more likely to disclose CSR reports and a chaebol firm’s CSR report disclosure is less evaluated than a non-chaebol firm in the capital market. The result indicates that even if CSR report disclosure may have positive effect on firm value in general, investors may discount the value of chaebol firms’ CSR reports.

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Background:This study aims to contribute to the ongoing policy and scholarly debate on physician-hospital integration (INT) and health care cost by providing evidence for the role of physician boards in mitigating hospital expenditure associated with INT.Methods:We conducted our study of the relationship between INT, physician boards, and hospital expenditure using data on hospitals in California. We obtained data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, American Hospital Association, and California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development from 2002 to 2006. A hospital fixed-effect ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis was used.Results:Hospital expenditure was higher in a hospital with an integrated arrangement (e.g., a hospital that adopted an integrated salary model) than under other independent arrangements between physicians and hospitals, and the proportion of physician members on hospital boards negatively moderated the effect of integration on hospital expenditure.Conclusions:Physician boards may provide a context that affords benefits that can reduce hospital expenditures under INT. This finding highlights the importance to having a supportive organizational design when implementing INT.