Do Multimember Districts Lead to Free‐Riding?

Abstract

We studied the effects of districting on intergovernmental aid by state governments to local governments in the United States. We found that metropolitan areas receive relatively more aid when represented in the state legislature by an at‐large delegation than when divided into single‐member districts. This suggests that the free‐riding that may occur with at‐large representation is more than counterbalanced by other factors. The estimated effects are robust to the effects of other confounding factors as well as the choice of estimators.

The Effect of Electoral Geography on Pork Barreling in Bicameral Legislatures

“…9 9 However, Snyder and Ueda (2007) find that in U.S. state legislatures, any free riding that occurs among legislators is outweighed by the effect of multimember districts’ larger geographic sizes. …”

Electoral Institutions and Legislative Particularism

“…Since many states used at‐large congressional districts until the 1960s, future research in American politics could explore how the distribution of other concentrated benefits, such as railroads, rivers and harbors projects, and tariffs, was influenced by the nature of the congressional delegation. In fact, the nature of these goods themselves—for instance, the degree to which their provision required cooperation between federal legislators and local authorities—could have conditioned the relationship between districting institutions and their provision, as Snyder and Ueda () suggest. In addition, future research could also explore how districting institutions affected other incentives for legislative behavior, such as the incentives for legislators to seek particular committee assignments (e.g., Katz and Sala ) or exhibit party loyalty (e.g., Carson et al ).…”

“…In fact, the most comprehensive empirical studies to date that focus on distributive outcomes find that MMD is associated with increased particularism. For instance, Snyder and Ueda () study the provision of state transfers to local governments in the United States from 1968 to 1984 and find that local governments represented by multimember districts in the state legislature received increased transfers. Hirano () leverages electoral reforms undertaken in Japan in 1925 and 1994 and finds that legislators elected under MMD had stronger incentives to cultivate a geographically specific personal vote due to party competition and the single nontransferable vote system .…”

“…In this article, I build upon these literatures and other recent research on nineteenth‐century distributive politics in the United States (e.g., Finocchiaro ; Rogowski ) to study how districting institutions affect the provision of particularistic goods. Though prior theoretical work predicts that SMD increases the provision of distributive goods relative to MMD (e.g., Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita ; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina ; Dixit and Londregan ), empirical scholarship has produced limited evidence in support of this expectation (e.g., Hirano ; Snyder and Ueda ). I use data on county‐level post office locations to study the distribution of particularistic goods in the United States between 1876 and 1896, a period in which many states elected at‐large congressional representatives.…”

The Impact of Electoral Arrangements on Minority Representation: District Magnitude and the Election of African American State Legislators

“…Finally, observations from the political arena raise questions about the effects of MMDs, at-large elections, and elections held in districts of greater magnitude on the candidacies of minorities. The support of many African American members of Congress for proposals to allow the states to elect U.S. House members in MMDs (e.g., Snyder and Ueda 2007) suggests these electoral arrangements may no longer disadvantage contemporary black politicians and voters.…”