Do pills poison operating performance?

Danielson, Morris G.; Karpoff, Jonathan M.

doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.10.001

Cited by 51 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 30 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Consistent with Stein's (1988) Managerial Myopia Hypothesis, I find that greater takeover provision protection is positively associated with innovation efforts across multiple specifications. The results support recent evidence by Danielson and Karpoff (2006) and Straska and Waller (2010) that the presence of takeover provisions can be beneficial for certain firms.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 88%

Governance and innovation

Becker‐Blease

2011

Journal of Corporate Finance

118

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 88%

Governance and innovation

Becker‐Blease

2011

Journal of Corporate Finance

118

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Mahoney et al (1997) found that a dual chair does not influence R&D intensity. 3 Danielson and Karpoff (2006) also found that adopting "poison pills" 4 is one entrenchment practice which does not influence R&D intensity.…”

Section: Randd Decisions and The Defense Of Shareholders' Rightsmentioning

confidence: 97%

The impact of corporate governance practices on R&D efforts: a look at shareholders' rights, cross-listing, and control pyramid

Lhuillery¹

2011

Industrial and Corporate Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The article considers the impact of multiple shareholder-oriented governance practices on R&D decisions. Based on a sample of 5528 firms belonging to 110 large French listed business groups, our results substantiate the idea that shareholder-oriented governance practices and a lower position in a control pyramid are better for R&D investment. The introduction of any additional shareholder oriented practice is found to result in more R&D. We show, however, that this Anglo-Americanization of the French corporate governance system is only partial.We provide evidence of the co-existence of an old French system of corporate governance with a hybrid model of corporate governance. The lack of concrete results on complementarity among shareholder-oriented governance practices casts doubt on the stability of this hybrid model in the French context. JEL classification: G34, O31, O32.

show abstract

“…Furthermore, Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) and Heron and Lie (2006) find that targets with poison pills receive higher bids, while Danielson and Karpoff (2006) determine that operating performance improves for firms after poison pills are implemented. These findings suggest that the initial negative market reaction to the adoption of poison pills might not be justified.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%