2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.003
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Governance and innovation

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Cited by 118 publications
(49 citation statements)
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“…A detailed set of corporate governance provisions are analysed, rather than one single dimension, which allows the taking into account of several dimensions simultaneously. The focus on practices affecting the relationships between managers and shareholders allows the testing of the basic premises of agency theory, with respect to R&D. The paper provides empirical evidence on a multi-country sample of companies, thus complementing previous studies, which focused on single countries, such as France (Lhuillery, 2011), the United Kingdom (Driver and Coelho Guedes, 2012) or the United States (Becker-Blease, 2011). Addressing these issues is important because policies designed to improve shareholders' protection might actually have a negative impact on flexibility and risktaking, as evidenced by recent studies on the consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States (Bargeron et al, 2010;Cohen et al, 2009).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 89%
“…A detailed set of corporate governance provisions are analysed, rather than one single dimension, which allows the taking into account of several dimensions simultaneously. The focus on practices affecting the relationships between managers and shareholders allows the testing of the basic premises of agency theory, with respect to R&D. The paper provides empirical evidence on a multi-country sample of companies, thus complementing previous studies, which focused on single countries, such as France (Lhuillery, 2011), the United Kingdom (Driver and Coelho Guedes, 2012) or the United States (Becker-Blease, 2011). Addressing these issues is important because policies designed to improve shareholders' protection might actually have a negative impact on flexibility and risktaking, as evidenced by recent studies on the consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States (Bargeron et al, 2010;Cohen et al, 2009).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 89%
“…Consistent with this argument, Faleye et al () show that intense monitoring on the management leads to diminished corporate innovation. Becker‐Blease (), Chemmanur and Tian (), and Cremers et al () provide evidence that classified boards are positively related to firm value and innovation, and Cremers et al () show that board declassification is associated with significant firm value decrease. While previous literature mainly investigates the positive impact of classified boards on firm value measured by Tobin's Q or innovation output, we focus on the M&A target valuation because it provides an advantage in measuring the value of R&D investment…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to relate classified boards to target shareholder value through better R&D and innovation. While existing studies show the positive impact of classified boards, they have mainly been concerned with either stronger bargaining power (e.g., Comment and Schwert ; Bates et al ; Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes‐Kropf ), or been focused on firm value measured by Tobin's Q or innovation (e.g., Becker‐Blease ; Cremers et al ; Chemmanur and Tian ). The study by Humphery‐Jenner () is the closest to this study, but the subject of his research is acquiring firms, not targets, and the effects of R&D intensity and external governance are not considered.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, shareholder wealth rises when management takes action to prevent changes in control (Gaughan, 2007;Becker-Blease, 2011). Pearce and Robinson (2004) point out that rejecting the initial offer may force the offeror to sweeten the offer.…”
Section: Corporate Governance Mechanisms In Hostile Takeoversmentioning
confidence: 99%