Do Public‐Sector Strike Bans Really Prevent Conflict?

Abstract

This article examines the effectiveness of strike-ban laws in reducing industrial conflict at the municipal level of government. Our central findings are that job actions were higher in states that had no law or no finality in the law, publicity campaigns were used as a pressure tactic in the bargaining process, and grievance delays were greatest under final offer arbitration. Thus dispute costs are highest in jurisdictions that provide no finality in dispute resolution whether or not an explicit framework for bargaining exists.

A Novel Calculus? Institutional Change, Globalization and Industrial Conflict in Europe

“…This is surprising, since many observers argue that the legislative framework strongly influences the level and pattern of strikes. In the USA, for example, public-sector strike bans have been shown to have significant damping effects (Hebdon and Stern, 2003). Yet in Europe, if the workers wish to strike, the specific national institutional rules are apparently of little significance.…”

Regulating Conflict in Public Sector Labour Relations

“…L'arbitrage n'est pas la seule option offerte au lieu du recours à la grève chez les employés du secteur public. Par exemple, aux États-Unis, la plupart des conflits dans le secteur public se terminent par une sorte de commission d'enquête ou par une médiation qui ne lie pas les parties (Hebdon et Stern 2003). Au Canada, le dernier recours, lorsque l'impasse persiste, consiste soit à offrir un droit limité à la grève, soit à recourir à l'imposition de l'arbitrage obligatoire, ou bien le choix entre l'arbitrage ou le recours à la grève (Adell, Grant et Ponak 2001).…”

“…There is mounting evidence, for example, of a higher number of grievances and grievance arbitrations under no-strike laws in Ontario and the U.S. municipal sector (Hebdon andStern 1998, 2003). Hebdon and Stern (2003) also found that arbitration laws had no effect in reducing strikes or job actions (e.g., sickouts, slowdowns, working-to-rule actions, and wildcat walkouts). Moreover, job actions levels and union political activity were found to be higher under states with final offer arbitration 2 as the final step.…”

“…Thus for public employees who are deemed essential by the relevant provincial, state, or federal bargaining legislation or administrative agency arbitration is not the only available strike replacement option. In the U.S., for example, most public sector disputes end in some form of non-binding fact-finding or mediation (Hebdon and Stern 2003). In Canada, the final step, if there is an impasse, is to either provide a limited right to strike, impose compulsory arbitration, or, in a few cases, offer a choice of arbitration or striking (Adell, Grant and Ponak 2001).…”

A Roadmap to Municipal Reform: Improving Life in Canadian Cities

“…Hebdon and Mazerolle (2003) found that mandatory arbitration led to an increase in employer-employee impasses at the bargaining table as high as 21 percent of the time relative to workers with the right to strike. They also found that while strike-ban legislation is probably successful in reducing the likelihood of strikes, it increases the likelihood of other types of disputes, such as work-torule situations or work slowdowns (see also Hebdon and Stern 2003).…”