“…8 Even though the majority of studies find that political connections are beneficial for firms, some studies show that corporate political connections are costly due to rent-seeking by politicians (see Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000;Thesmar, 2006a, 2006b;Fisman, Fisman, Galef, and Khuranna, 2006;Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007). 9 See also Knight (2006), Shon (2006), and Jayachandran (2006) for evidence that firms benefit from political contributions. On the other hand, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003), Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ueda (2004), and Hersch, Netter, and Pope (2008) show that political contributions have no significant impact on legislator voting behavior and on firm valuation.…”