Do Unions Punish Democrats? Free-Trade Votes and Labor PAC Contributions, 1999–2012

Abstract

This article examines whether labor unions punish incumbent Democrats who vote for free-trade bills in Congress. We theorize that punishment is a risky strategy for interest groups that prefer one party over the other. Therefore, interest groups must be substantially affected by decline in party support to punish. Consistent with our theory, we find important differences between public- and private-sector unions in their willingness to punish. Although public-sector unions articulate opposition to free trade, they do not follow through with either deterrence (withholding contributions to send a signal) or incapacitation (withholding contributions to replace the wayward candidate with a more supportive one). Private-sector unions, specifically unions that organize trade-vulnerable industrial workers, do attempt to punish Democrats via deterrence. The estimated deterrence effect is a 6 percent reduction in contributions. This study improves on previous studies by modeling punishment across several congressional sessions and multiple trade votes. The results reveal new insights into labor’s approach to declining protectionism among congressional Democrats.

Labor Unions and Support for Redistribution in an Era of Inequality*

“…Unions have also protested against high levels of executive compensation, particularly at the expense of rank‐and‐file employees (Lichtenstein, ; Western and Rosenfeld, ). Furthermore, unions disproportionately support the pro‐redistributive (compared to the Republicans) Democratic Party (Anzia and Moe, ; Dark, ; Jansa and Hoyman, ), endorsing candidates and mobilizing their members for political action on behalf of union‐backed candidates and ballot initiatives (Asher et al., ; Flavin and Radcliff, ; Flavin and Hartney, ; Francia and Bigelow, ; Francia and Orr, ; Kerrissey and Schofer, ; Radcliff and Davis, ; Zullo, ) . The egalitarian norms that labor unions promote, along with general support for left‐leaning politicians and liberal policies, should not be lost upon their members.…”

Labor Unions and Non-member Political Protest Mobilization in the United States

“…In addition, other work may seek to examine how coalitions of related groups such as worker centers or community organizations jointly coordinate non-member protest activity. Relatedly, different unions may have different strategies and orientations toward political organizing (Ahlquist and Levi 2013; Jansa and Hoyman 2018; Kim and Margalit 2017). How the heterogeneity in unions’ strategies relates to non-member protest mobilization is fertile ground for future work.…”

State Labor Laws and Government Responsiveness to Public Opinion

“…That strength is exercised through multiple channels. Both private and public sector unions seek to impact government decision-making by making campaign contributions (Jansa and Hoyman 2018;Moe 2011), mobilizing their members to participate in politics (Francia 2006;Flavin and Hartney 2015;Rosenfeld 2014), endorsing candidates for election (Moe 2011;Sieg and Wang 2013;Zoorob 2019), lobbying elected officials (Dark 1999), and launching campaigns to alter public opinion (Hertel-Fernandez et al 2021). As noted above, only public sector unions can also shape government policy outcomes-such as pay, benefits, and work rules-directly through the collective bargain process itself in a way their private sector cousins cannot (Moe 2009).…”