Do US Firms Have an Incentive To Comply With the FLSA and the NLRA?

Stansbury, Anna

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3874221

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…As early as 1935, a clause in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) established worker rights to discuss pay, a central part of labor organizing; however, these protections were described in very general terms—“protecting concerted activity”—and violators did not face punitive damages, which led to the critique of the NLRA as a “toothless tiger” (Green (2014)). Stansbury (2021) found the NLRA did not create sufficient incentives for firms to comply. More recently, individual U.S. states have enacted ROWTT laws, purportedly to combat discriminatory pay.…”

Section: Empirical Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency

Cullen¹,

Pakzad-Hurson

2023

ECTA

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The discourse around pay transparency has focused on partial equilibrium effects: how workers rectify pay inequities through informed renegotiation. We investigate how employers respond in equilibrium. We study a model of bargaining under two‐sided incomplete information. Our model predicts that transparency reduces the individual bargaining power of workers, leading to lower average wages. A key insight is that employers credibly refuse to pay high wages to any one worker to avoid costly renegotiations with others. When workers have low individual bargaining power, pay transparency has a muted effect. We test our model with an event‐study analysis of U.S. state‐level laws protecting the right of private sector workers to communicate salary information with their coworkers. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, transparency laws empirically lead wages to decline by approximately 2%, and wage declines are smallest in magnitude when workers have low individual bargaining power.

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Section: Empirical Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency

Cullen¹,

Pakzad-Hurson

2023

ECTA

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“…Whether sectoral shifts changed the organizational playbook, or within-sector forces increased the difficulty level, formational obstacles appear to have increased. Stansbury (2021) demonstrated that current penalties for violating the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) are simply insufficient to induce firms to comply. As long as back pay for firing pro-union workers remains the primary tooth in NLRB enforcement, firms will continue to flaunt regulations and unions will continue to struggle.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decomposing the Decline of Unions: Revisiting Sectoral and Regional Shifts

Schaller

2022

ILR Review

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This study uses newly disaggregated National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election data to revisit the theory that sectoral and regional shifts in economic activity contributed substantially to private-sector union decline in the United States. Unlike most studies, which focus on differential employment growth among union and non-union establishments, this article focuses on how such shifts may have affected organizational rates themselves. Improved data permit a shift-share decomposition that indicates that approximately 40% of the decline in union elections is in response to sectoral shifts, the majority attributable to changes within each sector. Moreover, in an update to Dickens and Leonard’s 1985 study, the author shows that declining organization rates since 1980 are responsible for a decline in union density of 5.4 percentage points.

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Do US Firms Have an Incentive To Comply With the FLSA and the NLRA?

Cited by 2 publications

References 35 publications

Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency

Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency

Decomposing the Decline of Unions: Revisiting Sectoral and Regional Shifts

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