Do Voters Vote Sincerely?

Abstract

In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections, the hypothesis that voters vote sincerely is potentially falsifiable, and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested. We then consider an application of our theoretical framework and assess whether the behavior of voters is consistent with sincere voting in U.S. national elections in the post-war period. We find that by and large sincere voting can explain virtually all of the individual-level observations on voting behavior in presidential and congressional U.S. elections in the data.

Learning and Coordination in the Presidential Primary System

“…8 In elections with more than two candidates, there are generally many Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. However, sincere voting is a standard assumption in the literature for multicandidate elections, and also appears to capture voter behavior in many elections (see Degan and Merlo (2006)). Also note that in our model participation in exogenous and thus we do model how changes in the field of candidates affects incentives to vote and voting turnout.…”

Inferring Strategic Voting

“…We model plurality-rule elections in which N candidates compete for one seat. Voters cast a vote for one candidate, 7 and the candidate receiving the highest number of votes is elected to o¢ ce (ties are broken with equal probability). We restrict attention to the case when N 3 since strategic voting is otherwise not an issue.…”

“…Accordingly, our estimate of misaligned voting (1.9%, 5.0%) is comparable to the estimates of strategic voting reported in the previous literature, which ranges from 3% to 17%. 6 One closely related paper is Degan and Merlo (2007). They consider the falsi…ability of sincere voting, and show that individual-level observations of voting in at least two elections are required to falsify sincere voting.…”

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule

“…Furthermore, by endorsing, the extremist makes it more likely that the closer moderate candidate wins, which improves the policy outcome 7 . The issue is whether moderate candidates seek an endorsement.…”

“…* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Other regressors always included: third degree polynomial in population. Election year fixed effects included in columns (1-6) Municipality fixed effects included in column (7)(8) In columns (1-6) the variable Above 15000 equals 1 in the municipalities above 15000 inhabitants and 0 otherwise In column (7-8) the variable Dual ballot equals 1 in the municipalities above 15000 inhabitants after 1992 and 0 otherwise, the variable Single ballot equals 1 in the municipalities below 15000 inhabitants after 1992 and 0 otherwise Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Other regressors always included: third degree polynomial in population.…”