Does government funding depoliticize non-governmental organizations? Examining evidence from Europe

Abstract

Prior work suggests that government funding can encourage non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to engage in political advocacy and public policy. We challenge this finding and examine two theoretical explanations for the dampening effect of government funding on NGO lobbying. First, donors are known to discipline NGO activity via an implicit or explicit threat to withdraw funding should the organization become too radical or political. Second, NGOs with more radical political agendas are less willing to seek or accept government funding for fear this will limit or delegitimize their activities. Using data from the European Union’s Transparency Register, we find that the share of government funding in NGO budgets is negatively associated with lobbying expenditure. This effect is statistically significant and substantial, which provides a reason for concern about NGO resource dependence. Even when governments are motivated by honorable intentions, their financial assistance has the (unintended) effect of dampening NGOs’ political activity.

Do Professionals Take Over? Professionalisation and Membership Influence in Civil Society Organisations

“…However, it is often presumed that professionalisation and involvement in public policymaking, combined with shifted resource dependencies, could lead to declining levels of membership influence. For instance, membership-based CSOs that heavily depend on government funding may moderate or even alter their advocacy work to comply with government priorities and regulations attached to that funding, to the detriment of members’ interests (Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2016 ; Mosley 2012 ; Neumayr et al 2015 ). And, as argued by Knoke ( 1981 , pp.…”

Advocacy group effects in global governance: populations, strategies, and political opportunity structures

“…National institutions, including tax and lobbying laws, have differential effects on the resources available to specific types of advocacy groups. In addition, selective government funding is an important source of advocacy group mobilization (Dür and Mateo 2013;Beyers et al 2008;Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2017). Resources, in turn, may allow for group effects in global governance due to structural power (Bernhagen and Bräuninger 2005), personnel and finances (McCarthy and Zald 1978), information (Lohmann 1998;Bouwen 2002;Tallberg et al 2018), and group leadership (Halpin and Jordan 2009).…”

Correction to: Lobbying the lobbyists: when and why do policymakers seek to influence advocacy groups in global governance?

“…Others have moved even further and have argued that the relationship between advocacy organizations and policymakers is strongly steered by the behaviour of policymakers (Ainsworth 1993(Ainsworth , 1997Holyoke 2009Holyoke , 2011Matthews 1960). There is a large body of literature dealing with how governments affect the behaviour of advocacy groups through government funding and patronage (Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2017;Cooley and Ron 2002;Heylen and Willems 2018;Mahoney 2004;Molenaers et al 2011;Neumayr et al 2015;Persson and Edholm 2018;Verschuere and De Corte 2014). Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire (2017), for instance, show that government subsidies can have a dampening effect on the advocacy activities of NGOs, and Heylen and Willems (2018) demonstrate how subsidies steer the choice for advocacy venues.…”

“…There is a large body of literature dealing with how governments affect the behaviour of advocacy groups through government funding and patronage (Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2017;Cooley and Ron 2002;Heylen and Willems 2018;Mahoney 2004;Molenaers et al 2011;Neumayr et al 2015;Persson and Edholm 2018;Verschuere and De Corte 2014). Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire (2017), for instance, show that government subsidies can have a dampening effect on the advocacy activities of NGOs, and Heylen and Willems (2018) demonstrate how subsidies steer the choice for advocacy venues. There is a considerable amount of research on how policymakers affect the mobilization of advocacy groups by focussing mostly on government funding and financial dependencies.…”

“…The goal of this article is to conceptually outline and empirically assess the 'influence flow' from policymakers to advocacy groups. Former studies in this tradition have taught us that political institutions can shape the behaviour of advocacy groups (see Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire 2017;Cooley and Ron 2002;Heylen and Willems 2018;Mahoney 2004;Molenaers et al 2011;Neumayr et al 2015;Persson and Edholm 2018;Verschuere and De Corte 2014) and that policymakers pressure these groups into defending policy positions in line with their preferences (Holyoke 2009;Heaney 2006;Heaney and Leifeld 2018;Heaney and Rojas 2015). We build on these findings and seek to explore and explain how policymakers try to shape the policy positions of advocacy groups.…”