Background:Body mass index (BMI) is widely accepted in determining obesity. Skinfold thickness measurements have been commonly used to determine percentage of body fat.Hypothesis:The authors hypothesize that because BMI does not measure fat directly but relies on body weight alone, a large percentage of athletic adolescents will be misclassified as obese by BMI.Design:Cross-sectional study.Methods:To compare BMI and skinfold measurements as indicators for obesity in the adolescent athletic population, anthropometric data (height, weight, percentage body fat, age, and sex) were recorded from 33 896 student athletes (average age, 15 years; range, 11-19 years) during preparticipation physical examinations from 1985 to 2003. BMI was calculated from height and weight. Percentage of body fat was determined by measuring skinfold thickness.Results:According to their BMI percentile, 13.31% of adolescent athletes were obese. Using the skinfold method, only 5.95% were obese. Of those classified as obese by the BMI, 62% were considered false positives by the skinfold method. In contrast, there was a 99% probability that the nonobese by BMI would not be obese by the skinfold method (negative predictive value = 0.99).Conclusions:BMI is a measurement of relative body weight, not body composition. Because lean mass weighs far more than fat, many adolescent athletes are incorrectly classified as obese based on BMI. Skinfold testing provides a more accurate body assessment than BMI in adolescent athletes.Clinical Relevance:Correct body composition data can help to provide better diet and activity guidelines and prevent the psychological problems associated with being labeled as obese.

Prior work suggests that government funding can encourage non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to engage in political advocacy and public policy. We challenge this finding and examine two theoretical explanations for the dampening effect of government funding on NGO lobbying. First, donors are known to discipline NGO activity via an implicit or explicit threat to withdraw funding should the organization become too radical or political. Second, NGOs with more radical political agendas are less willing to seek or accept government funding for fear this will limit or delegitimize their activities. Using data from the European Union’s Transparency Register, we find that the share of government funding in NGO budgets is negatively associated with lobbying expenditure. This effect is statistically significant and substantial, which provides a reason for concern about NGO resource dependence. Even when governments are motivated by honorable intentions, their financial assistance has the (unintended) effect of dampening NGOs’ political activity.

Why do Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries vary in their regulatory approach toward nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)? This article introduces an index to assess NGO regulation regarding barriers to entry, NGOs’ political capacity, and economic activity. Our cross-section analysis of 28 OECD countries offers preliminary evidence of systematic differences in NGO regulation between corporatist and pluralist systems. We suggest corporatist systems have more restrictive regulations because NGOs risk upsetting the political order and managed social consensus. In pluralist countries, NGOs face fewer restrictions because governments view them as substitutes for formal communication channels. We present two cases, Japan (corporatist) and the United States (pluralist), to illustrate this argument. In sum, macroinstitutional arrangements of political representation have a crucial bearing on national styles of NGO regulation. Future uses of this index include examining the effects of national context on international NGOs (INGOs), explaining variations in organizational structures and strategies among NGOs, and tracking variations in NGO–state relations over time.

What can models of interest group behaviour from American politics tell us about the existence, activities, and influence of international non-governmental advocacy organisations (advocacy INGOs) in International Relations? In this article I detail an analogy between traditional American interest groups and advocacy INGOs in order to suggest a new approach to theorising INGOs. American politics theories of interest groups provide insights to questions which International Relations has been unable to answer satisfactorily, including where INGOs are likely to be found; how INGOs will grow in the future; the organisational structure of INGOs; the impact of competing groups on the quality and content of foreign policy and international agreements; and the roles of INGOs in different stages of the policy process. Viewing INGOs as interest groups provides a curative to the tendency to view them as self-sacrificing knights in shining armour. Competing INGOs representing narrow interests can nevertheless contribute to the common good in the form of effective, efficient policy.

Global governance is no longer a matter of state cooperation or bureaucratic politics. Since the end of the cold war, advocacy groups have proliferated and enjoyed increasing access to global governance institutions such as the European Union, World Trade Organization, and the United Nations climate conferences. This special issue seeks to push theories of interest groups and international non-governmental organizations forward. We argue that the advocacy group effects on global governance institutions are best understood by examining how groups use and shape domestic and global political opportunity structures. The individual articles examine how, when, and why domestic and global political opportunity structures shape advocacy group effects in global governance, across global institutions, levels of government, advocacy organizations, issue areas, and over time. As special interests are becoming increasingly involved in global governance, we need to better understand how advocacy organizations may impact global public goods provision.