Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection along the Chinese Administrative Ladder

Landry, Pierre F.; Lü, Xiaobo; Duan, Haiyan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2452482

Cited by 49 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 45 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Taken together, we find no evidence for Implication 4 that the central government appoints homegrown party secretaries based on the previous provincial economic performance. The result is consistent with the argument of Landry, Lü, and Duan (Landry et al., ) that the appointment decision of high‐ranking officials such as provincial party secretaries is likely affected by non‐economic factors, because it has substantial implications on the balance of power between factions at the central level.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 89%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Familiarity breeds growth: The impact of factional ties on local cadres’ economic performance in China

Wong

Zhong

2019

Economics & Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Some attribute China's rapid economic growth to a cadre promotion system that rewards economic performance. Others argue that political promotion in China hinges on factionalism. Extant empirical studies often assume that performance can be measured independently from the effect of factionalism. We test the validity of this assumption by examining whether local cadres’ economic performance would change as a result of losing vertical ties to a higher authority. We find an immediate increase in the growth rates of local GDP and government revenue. However, the performance change is mediated by the type of succeeding leaders, as it occurs only under locally promoted leaders who have existing ties with the local cadres. We further examine various channels through which a leader's insider status may affect local economic performance and find that newly appointed outsider leaders would cut fiscal transfers to the local level, which may explain the drop in their short‐term performance.

show abstract

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 89%

“…Landry, Lü, and Duan () propose a theory to reconcile the two dominant views. They argue that lower officials pose no political threat to the top leaders.…”

Section: Political Selection In China: Performance Vs Connectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Familiarity breeds growth: The impact of factional ties on local cadres’ economic performance in China

Wong

Zhong

2019

Economics & Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Another school holds that economic performance increases the likelihood of promotion (Li & Zhou 2005;Landry 2008;Yao 2016). A third contends that economic performance matters more as a factor for promotion at lower levels of government, whereas political connectedness matters more at the central level (Choi 2012;Landry, Lü & Duan 2014). …”

Section: The Party's Role Within the Statementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The proposition that economic performance matters more as a factor for promotion at lower levels of government (Choi 2012;Landry, Lü & Duan 2014) may apply to lower level subsidiaries of central SOEs (see column 2). Indeed, this is the only group of companies for which firm profitability and the leader's education credentials are positively and significantly associated with promotion.…”

Section: Performance Versus Political Connections For Promotionmentioning

confidence: 99%

China's SOE Executives: Drivers of or Obstacles to Reform?

Brødsgaard

Hubbard

Cai³

et al. 2017

cjas

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Drawing on a database tracking the career of 1,250 top Chinese executives from 1,084 publicly-listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this article analyzes differences in career incentives for subsidiaries controlled by the central government compared to those controlled by local governments. It also considers the differences for executives in listed companies close to the parent group compared to those that are heads in distant subsidiaries. We find that in both SOEs and their publicly listed subsidiaries, administrative experience or political connections appear to increase the likelihood of promotion. However, in the case of central SOE subsidiaries, leaders are more likely to be promoted based on financial performance. For both central and local 'direct' SOE groups age is a significant negative factor for promotion, whereas tenure is a significant positive factor.

show abstract

“…As a result environmental protection remains by and large subordinated to economic policies. In this context, it is reported, that promoting growth and attracting investments have been the most important criteria in responsibility contracts for leading cadres at the sub-provincial level (Edin 2003;Ong 2012;Landry et al 2015). Thus, economic performance represents an important political career factor and at the same time creates the financial means needed for promoting environmental law enforcement.…”

Section: (C) Economic Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A fragmented environmental state? Analysing spatial compliance patterns for the case of transparency legislation in China

Brehm

2017

Asia-Pac J Reg Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Do Chinese cities compete for investments with lax environmental law enforcement? The here presented study suggests that this is true for some municipalities but not all of them. Based on data for 126 key environmental protection cities and regional economic hubs between 2010 and 2012 we show that economic decentralization and political centralization both shape spatial patterns of compliance with environmental transparency legislation. Our results give reason to suppose that the Chinese economy moved beyond homogenous preferences for low-cost regulatory arrangements. The emerging jurisdictional interaction is in line with a Tiebout sorting process, where cities compete with diverse factor packages to attract an optimal amount of investments.

show abstract

Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection along the Chinese Administrative Ladder

Cited by 49 publications

References 45 publications

Familiarity breeds growth: The impact of factional ties on local cadres’ economic performance in China

Familiarity breeds growth: The impact of factional ties on local cadres’ economic performance in China

China's SOE Executives: Drivers of or Obstacles to Reform?

A fragmented environmental state? Analysing spatial compliance patterns for the case of transparency legislation in China

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About