Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?

Abstract

To begin with, I clarify the thesis that I will criticize, namely, the thesis that cognitive phenomenology plays an important role in grounding mental content. Consider an example due to Horgan and Tienson (2002). You hear "Visiting relatives can be boring" fi rst as a remark about the people who are visiting and then as a remark about visiting certain people oneself. Horgan and Tienson say that the actual sound or auditory imagery may be the same, but the total experiences are phenomenally diff erent. h ey conclude that the two occurrent beliefs diff er in non-sensory phenomenology. Let cognitive phenomenology be the phenomenology (if such there be) that attaches to beliefs and other intentional states that is distinct from associated sensory phenomenology, where sensory phenomenology is understood broadly to include perceptual, bodily, imagistic, and emotional phenomenology. Horgan and Tienson say (2002: 522) that cognitive phenomenology is quite rich: "Change either the attitude-type (believing, desiring, wondering, hoping, etc.) or the particular intentional content, and the phenomenal character thereby changes too." So, for instance, they believe in a special non-sensory, conative phenomenology that helps individuate our desires. (I will use "cognitive phenomenology" broadly, so that it also covers conative phenomenology.) Call the minimal thesis that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology the CP-existence thesis. h is thesis has been widely discussed (see Montague 2010 for a helpful overview). Many put forward a second, much stronger thesis about cognitive phenomenology that has not been widely discussed. It will be my primary focus. Here are some representative passages: How can [cognitive] experience ever deliver determinateness? It just can. Cognitive experience in causal context can do just this. Such is its power. (When it comes to [thinking of] the number 2, it doesn't even require causal context.). .. If God could look into my mind and apprehend the cognitive [phenomenology] of my experience he would certainly know what I was thinking about, given that he also knewand how could he not-about my causal circumstances. It is the same power that makes it the case that I can think determinately about the number 2 although there is no relevant causal context. Pff f! h is is the correct account of how it is that content can be determinate in spite of all the problems raised for this idea by Kripke in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.

The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness

“…It is also worth mentioning that this idea relies on a misunderstanding of Lewis (see Pautz ). Lewis thought that the naturalness constraint only applies at the level of mental content to belief .…”

“…In fact, it falls out of this view that in a creature without conscious experiences (e. g. the Simple System example used earlier) determinate intentionality is not possible (see Pautz ). The view therefore supports a form of Russell's claim that “all cognitive relations—belief and desire—presuppose acquaintance” (, 1) and Chalmers's more recent claim that “acquaintance is a condition on the possibility of thought and justification” (Chalmers , 467).…”

Fenomenologia cognitiva

“…Encara un altre tipus de respostes apel·la a elements de caire emocional, com són l'ansietat o el parar atenció de manera molt aguda per explicar la diferència entre la situació d'entendre i de no entendre (Robinson 2011). Recentment, i respecte dels casos hipotètics com el de Kriegel (2015), Pautz (2013) ha argumentat que els escenaris de contrast fenomènic on hi intervenen zombis no són imaginables.…”

The rational role of experience

“…The only alternative approach is short-arm conceptual role semantics, which suffers from an explanatory gap, and, as a result, cannot explain any cognitive content. Mendola (2008), Kriegel (2011a,b), Smithies (2012aSmithies ( , 2013aSmithies ( ,b, 2014, Graham (2012), andPautz (2013). Chalmers (2012) is also sympathetic.…”

“…15 Pautz (2013) might have a better motivation for phenomenal functionalism from a broadly Lewisian view of propositional attitudes.…”