Does the Union/Non‐union Wage Differential Exist?*

Treble, John G.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.1984.tb00776.x

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…A different picture emerges from the British experience, where different industrial relations arrangements exist. As shown in in Treble (1984) using SIC 3-digit industrylevel dataand in Metcalf and Stewart (1992) using the 1984 W-IRS datathe ability of unions to affect wages is limited to intitutional settings where union density is over 90-95%. However, the progressive demise of closed shops and the trend in union derecognition which has occurred since the early 1980s (as documented by Gregg and Machin, 1991;and Disney, Gosling and Machin, 1993) might push the British system closer to that described above, increasing the ability of weaker unions to affect wages.…”

Section: Concluding Remarks and Comparisons With Other Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the vast empirical literature on unions' relative wage effects, the relationship between wage levels and local membershipwith some notable exceptionshas received little attention (Treble, 1984;Metcalf and Stewart, 1992). In what follows, the wage will be determined by decentralised negotiations between firm's management and local union representatives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Union Density and Relative Wages: What is the Relationship?

Lucifora

1995

Labour

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This paper examines the impact of union density on relative wages under decentralised bargaining settings. Whilst, traditionally, empirical studies have focused on the impact of union status on wages (either at the individual or at the plant level), here it is argued that local trade union density can have an independent (positive) effect on wages. This occurs through the threat of collective action and the ability of the union to impose costs onto employers. First, a Nash bargaining model is presented under efficient-bargaining settings, and a wage-membership equation is derived. Wages are shown to be an increasing and convex function of union membership. Second, an empirical specification of the wagemembership equation, suitable for estimation, is obtained and fitted to establishment-level data for the Italian metal-mechanical engineering industry. A positive monotonic relationship between wages and union density is detected. Furthermore, wages are shown to be increasing with union density even where no formal local bargaining agreement is in force, thus suggesting that "union-threat" effects might be relevant.

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