Does the Village Fund matter in Thailand? Evaluating the impact on incomes and spending

Boonperm, Jirawan; Haughton, Jonathan; Khandker, Shahidur R.

doi:10.1016/j.asieco.2013.01.001

Cited by 54 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Semi-formal institutions include various locally organised credit cooperatives and savings groups that operate according to their own regulatory frameworks and whose loans are often restricted to members. Loans given by the Thai revolving fund (the so-called Village Fund; see Boonperm, Haughton, & Khandker [2013]; Menkhoff & Rungruxsirivorn [2011]) are also considered semi-formal loans. In addition, policy loans are assigned to the semi-formal loan group because their lending procedures are more comparable to semi-formal institutions than to formal or informal lenders.…”

Section: Kislatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why are Informal Loans Still a Big Deal? Evidence from North-east Thailand

Kislat

2015

The Journal of Development Studies

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This article examines the use and benefit of informal loans for different income groups of rural households in north-east Thailand. Using a difference-in-differences estimation approach, which is later complemented by propensity score matching, the article shows that different household groups profit from informal loans in different ways. Poor households increase their asset endowment, and in particular farming assets, whereas rich households' (food) consumption rises, especially if households borrow due to a shock. By showing that informal loans serve different households for different purposes, this article provides an explanation why they still play an important role.

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Section: Kislatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why are Informal Loans Still a Big Deal? Evidence from North-east Thailand

Kislat

2015

The Journal of Development Studies

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“…11 Average loan size is approximately USD 450 which represents roughly 25% of a households's yearly income. 12 A detailed discussion of the application process that villages were required to follow to get access to the funds and the way in which those funds were delivered is provided by Kaboski and Townsend (2012), Boonperm et al (2013), Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn (2011) and Haughton et al (2014).I do not address that process here as all of the villages in the sample participated in the program. in the sample villages, and modif ed signif cantly the composition of the portfolio of loans in each village (See and Appendix Figure CXI).…”

Section: The Million Baht Village Fund Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

Targeting Credit through Community Members

Vera-Cossio

2018

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Delegating the allocation of public resources to community members is an increasingly popular form of delivering development programs and are associated with a tradeoff between improved information about potential benef ciaries and favoritism towards local elites. Unlike targeting cash transfers to the poor, the optimal targeting of credit is a more complex problem involving issues of productivity, repayment, and market responses: This paper analyzes this problem using a large-scale lending program, the Thai Million Baht Credit Fund, which decentralizes the allocation of loans to an elected group of community members, and provides three main results. First, exploiting a long and detailed panel, I recover pre-program structural estimates of household total factor productivity and f nd that resources from the program were not allocated to high-productivity, poor households, which is inconsistent with poverty and productive eff ciency as targeting criteria. Second, using socioeconomic networks data, I show that actual targeting is strongly driven by connections to village elites and is related to lower program profitability, which suggests favoritism as a reason for mistargeting. Finally, I exploit quasi-experimental variation in the rollout of the program and uncover evidence that, in general equilibrium, informal credit markets compensate for targeting distortions by redirecting credit towards unconnected households, albeit at higher interest rates than those provided by the program. The results highlight the limitations of community-driven approaches to program delivery and the role of markets in attenuating potential targeting errors.

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“…That said, this program also helps middle income people stay above the poverty line. On the other hand, show that VF associates to an increase in average spending of 3.5% and income of 1.4% [5]. They believe that the VF is a pro-poor program.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Has Behavior of Village Governments Toward Village Fund Management Changed as Regulation Treatment Takes Place? (Evidence from North Sulawesi Province, Indonesia)

Tasik¹,

Lengkong²

2019

Proceedings of the 5th Annual International Conference on Management Research (AICMaR 2018)

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Since 2015 the Indonesian government had started Village Fund (VF) program to increase villagers' purchasing power and welfare, build infrastructure and increase employment. However, there was evidence that the results of the programs were not as expected. Instead, there were many management and accountability problems found in the program. This study investigates the factors that can possibly explain the problems using four dimensions, namely, Financial Management, Village Infra-structure, Society Empowerment, and Misappropriation. Using a survey, we choose the officers from fifteen villages in North Sulawesi Province. Using score indexing, we study changes in behaviors of village officers toward these dimensions due to a treatment that we make. The treatment is to make the officers aware of the regulations required for VF management. We also examine how the change in the VF management leads to change in economic growth rate. The findings suggest that there is an improvement in the VF management after the treatment. Additionally, due to improvement in VF management, the villages can potentially experience economic growth rates of between 3.44% and 3.98% contributed solely by the VF program. Keywords-village fund; measure dimensions; management and usage; misappropriation A. Theoretical Framework and Hypo-ThesesVillage fund program has been a noteworthy topic in urban and public economics fields. Thailand and Indonesia are two countries among others in which VF program becomes a striking program to improve the economy of rural

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Does the Village Fund matter in Thailand? Evaluating the impact on incomes and spending

Cited by 54 publications

References 8 publications

Why are Informal Loans Still a Big Deal? Evidence from North-east Thailand

Why are Informal Loans Still a Big Deal? Evidence from North-east Thailand

Targeting Credit through Community Members

Has Behavior of Village Governments Toward Village Fund Management Changed as Regulation Treatment Takes Place? (Evidence from North Sulawesi Province, Indonesia)

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