We investigate the effect of the political regime on bilateral FDI flows from advanced to emerging countries over 1992-2004. We control for country size, per capita income and privatization proceeds in the host country, and use a random-effect Tobit model to exploit information from zero entries. Our results suggest that democracy does have a positive effect on the amount and probability of FDI flows from developed to emerging countries. Moreover, we find that the effect of democracy on FDI also works through the total factor productivity channel, not only the political risk one as suggested in the literature.JEL Classification: F23, P51, P48, C24.Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment ; Political regime; Democracy; Tobit models.
March 2008 -forthcoming Review of World Economicsa Selen Sarisoy Guerin, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 1 Place du Congres, 1000 Brussels, Belgium.b Stefano Manzocchi, Department of Economics, LUISS University, Viale Pola, 12, 00162 Rome, Italy.
(*)We thank an anonymous referee for his detailed comments. We also thank Cecilia Frale, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Pietro Reichlin, Daria Taglioni, Giovanna Vallanti and participants in seminars held at LUISS University, the European Central Bank and ECARES for helpful comments. Usual disclaimers apply.
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Introduction and motivationForeign direct investment (FDI) is often considered beneficial for both source and host economies, and a great deal of research as well as policy debate has recently focused both on FDI attraction by nations and regions, and on the international activities of multinational firms (UNCTAD, 2005). 1 From the early nineties and throughout the beginning of this century, FDI inflows have amounted to a large fraction of the emerging markets' GDP, while more recently some emerging countries have become net FDI exporters. Interestingly, among major FDI emerging recipients there have been both democratic countries and autocracies (e.g. China, Egypt, Morocco, according to the classification of best renowned academic sources).There exists a large and growing literature on the relationship between political regime and international trade. Mansfield et al. (2000) find that pairs of democratic countries set lower trade barriers and therefore engage in more open trade relations. Milner and Kubota (2005) argue that regime change towards democracy reduces the scope for the political elites to build support upon trade barriers, hence that it is democratization that enhances trade openness. More recently, Milner and Mukherjee (2007) have argued that democratization leads to skill-biased trade liberalization, as the ruling elites have an interest in reducing the revenues accruing to the middle class as the latter could become a political challenge. Aidt and Gassebner (2007) find that autocratic states trade substantially less than democracies, that this does not rely on peculiar estimation techniques, and that causality runs from political regime to trade flows.The econometric literature on the relationship between politica...