Recent findings of low societal consensus in cultural values suggest that our field's dominant paradigm-culture as shared values-is a fallacy. The perennial persistence of this illusion may come from that it appeals to the human brain's hardwired capacity for essentialism. Evidence against value consensus, however, does not doom all shared-meaning models of culture (pace Schwartz, 2013). I describe evidence for other kinds of mental representations (i.e., concepts, beliefs, norms) that are shared (in the sense of consensus, contagion, or conjoint control) and underlie culturally patterned behavior. Also I consider and probe Schwartz's (2013) proposed definition of culture as a society-level value system, raising questions about its ontology, functionalism and explanatory power, particularly with regard to understanding cultural change. While acknowledging the utility of aggregated value scores for many research programs, I conclude that psychology needs to study individual-level cultural representations and withinsociety variation in order to understand the dynamics of cultural influence and change.In popular discourse, "culture" is a vague and all-encompassing force that can be invoked to explain any of person's or group's behaviors or failings. As scientists we aim to build more precise models that avoid the fallacies of stereotypes and other intuitive biases about societal differences. Yet when we tighten our definitions of culture, we must always consider whether narrowing definitions will also narrow the questions that we can address.This essay responds to Schwartz's (2013) critique of shared-meaning models of culture and his updated theoretical justification for operationalizing culture with aggregated country-level scores from ratings of abstract values. Recent analyses have revealed that such value ratings are not highly consensual within nations, nor highly different across nations. Schwartz (2013) takes these results to have "shaken the confidence of psychology researchers in the prevailing conception of societal culture" (p. 3). Instead of the prevalent conception of culture as the values that a society's members share, Schwartz defines culture as a system of meaning that exists "external to the individual" (p. 5). On this basis, he provides a new rationalization of the methodological aproach of of operationalizing culture in terms of aggregated country-level value scores, an