Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation

Abstract

Democratic and autocratic states routinely violate their international agreements protecting human rights. Scholars typically link ratification and compliance behavior theoretically but test their models separately; however, if the behaviors are jointly determined then we should treat them that way empirically. We consider how domestic judiciaries influence the joint choice to ratify and comply with international human rights regimes. Using data on the ratification status of states under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), states' torture practices, and a series of measures of judicial effectiveness, we examine whether legal institutions are likely to constrain state behavior and by implication raise the costs of ratification.

Uncovering Patterns Among Latent Variables: Human Rights and De Facto Judicial Independence

“…6 Figure 1 plots the point estimates from the OLS model along with 90% and 95% confidence intervals. In contrast with previous research (Cross, 1999;Powell and Staton, 2009), this model specification provides no evidence that increased judicial independence decreases state respect for human rights. While the point estimate for de facto judicial independence is positive, the standard error is larger than the point estimate.…”

“…Though the relationship depends upon whether and to what degree our empirical models account for uncertainty in the measurement of latent constructs, increased de facto judicial independence appears to be associated with a substantial decrease in human rights abuses. Overall, the results provide strong support for theoretical and empirical claims that the existence of independent courts is associated with greater respect for human rights (Cross, 1999;Powell and Staton, 2009;Lupu, 2013). Lagged Outcome Measure: An interval variable that captures the degree to which a state respects human rights in a previous year (t-1).…”

“…Prior studies of the relationship between judicial independence and state respect for human rights typically use measures provided by or adapted from State Department and Amnesty International country year reports (Cross, 1999;Powell and Staton, 2009). However, the reporting standards of these organizations have changed, obscuring the true patterns of human rights practices over time .…”

Torture Approval in Comparative Perspective

“…The use of low magnitude proportional representation districts and an open list electoral system is further associated with fewer abuses (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010). A free press and popular suffrage (Conrad and Moore 2010) and an independent judiciary (Powell and Staton 2009) contribute to greater respect for human rights. The regular timing of free and fair elections and limits on executive power--necessary conditions for democratic consolidation--suggest fewer abuses of human rights by government agents.…”

The Space Between Ratification and Compliance: Implementation of International Human Rights Agreements

“…Consequently, these domestic actors may pressure states into following international human rights standards at all times. Ratification of international human rights may be affected by the likelihood of such system (Powell & Staton, 2009), but unless a state recognizes the direct application of international agreements in the absence of implementation, the change in domestic legislation will make the commitment to human rights more costly for member states.…”