Democratic and autocratic states routinely violate their international agreements protecting human rights. Scholars typically link ratification and compliance behavior theoretically but test their models separately; however, if the behaviors are jointly determined then we should treat them that way empirically. We consider how domestic judiciaries influence the joint choice to ratify and comply with international human rights regimes. Using data on the ratification status of states under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), states' torture practices, and a series of measures of judicial effectiveness, we examine whether legal institutions are likely to constrain state behavior and by implication raise the costs of ratification.

This paper seeks to understand why some countries accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) more readily than others. The theory focuses on institutional differences between the world's major legal systems: civil law, common law, and Islamic law. Important characteristics of these legal systems (stare decisis, bona fides, pacta sunt servanda) are integrated in an expressive theory of adjudication, which focuses on how adjudication enhances interstate cooperation by correlating strategies, constructing focal points, and signaling information. The theory considers the ability of states to communicate with each other, using acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction as a form of cheap talk. Empirical analyses show (1) civil law states are more likely to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ than common law or Islamic law states, (2) common law states place the greatest number of restrictions on their ICJ commitments, and (3) Islamic law states have the most durable commitments.

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Does a state's past win/loss record affect its subsequent choices of peaceful dispute resolution methods in territorial disputes? We present a theory that portrays attempts at peaceful resolution as a strategic process, by which states search for the most favorable forum. During the process of decision making, a state strategically chooses between several methods of peaceful resolution; its final choice is based on the state's past experience with this particular method. Empirical analysis of all attempts at peaceful resolution of territorial disputes from 1945 to 2003 shows that challenger states use their own record of victories and failures, as well as the win/ loss record of the target as indicators of the probability of winning in a subsequent dispute. This pattern is especially strong for the binding third-party methods, arbitration, and adjudication.

This paper focuses on how domestic legal systems influence states’ choices of peaceful dispute resolution methods. In order to increase familiarity with rules of peaceful resolution of disputes, states use their domestic legal systems to provide them with clues about the most trustworthy ways to settle disputes. States tend to choose methods of dispute resolution that are similar to those embedded in their domestic legal systems. Empirical analyses support the conjecture of a linkage between domestic law and interstate conflict management methods, showing that civil law dyads prefer more legalized dispute resolution methods compared to common law dyads. Islamic law dyads are most likely to use nonbinding third party methods, while common law dyads tend to resolve their territorial disputes through bilateral negotiations.