Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements

Marchiori, Carmen; Dietz, Simon; Tavoni, Alessandro

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2016.09.009

Cited by 61 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…We contribute to this literature by suggesting that the hierarchical structures underlying environmental policy may well be a reason for the rejection of otherwise beneficial policies. With respect to hierarchical policy structures within countries, our paper is related to Habla and Winkler (2013) and Marchiori et al (2017), in which the influence of legislative lobbying on the formation of international permit markets and on international environmental agreements, respectively, is analysed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

Habla

Winkler

2018

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select agents caring less for environmental damages than they do themselves in case of an international market regime, while they opt for self-representation in case of domestic markets. This strategic delegation incentive renders the linking of permit markets less attractive and constitutes a novel explanation for the reluctance to establish non-cooperative international permit markets.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

Habla

Winkler

2018

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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“…In the above framework, no group lobbies for more stringent environmental policy, although one would expect public provision of public goods to be an important aspect of domestic policies. However, the importance of lobbying groups in making environmental policies has also been emphasized by economists such as Oates and Portney [58], Carattini et al [59], and Marchiori et al [60] and by scholars in environmental politics (e.g., Bryner [61], and Kamieniecki [62], on the US; Markussen and Svendsen [63], and Michaelowa [64], on Europe).…”

Section: Lobbyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Emission Tax and Compensation Subsidy with Cross-Industry Pollution

et al. 2019

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This paper establishes a cross-industry pollution externality model. To explain a benevolent government, it may be possible to tax part of the welfare gains and use the revenue to compensate the affected polluted industry for the damage cost, thereby improving welfare. We show that the social welfare under emission tax with production subsidy is higher than the results of emission tax without production subsidy. The welfare of the polluted sector under emissions trading will be lower than the results of unbalanced budget environmental policy with subsidy. The welfare of the polluted labor union under lobby for compensation will be higher than the results of environmental policy with subsidy if the pollution damage and the weight on political contributions are sufficiently high.

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“…In this analysis, we will only concentrate on the case where all interest groups provide positive political contributions, as assumed in Habla and Winkler () and Marchiori et al. ().…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

International emissions trading in a political economy

Cheng

Chu

2019

Rev International Economics

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We examine whether the international emissions trading (IET) scheme can reduce global emissions in a political economy framework. Countries act noncooperatively when choosing the tradable emission permits and the environmental tax. The formulation of environmental policies is influenced by interest groups. Our results show that the effect of IET on global emissions depends crucially on which policies are influenced by lobbying activities. In the case where only environmental taxes are influenced by lobbying, IET tends to reduce global emissions when the capitalists’ political power is strong and, surprisingly, when the environmentalists’ political power is weak.

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Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements

Cited by 61 publications

References 19 publications

Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail

Emission Tax and Compensation Subsidy with Cross-Industry Pollution

International emissions trading in a political economy

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