Domestic reform as a rationale for gradualism in international cooperation

Urpelainen, Johannes

doi:10.1177/0951629811411749

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 83 publications

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“…Studies of gradualism, on the other hand, generally regard enforcement as unimportant to international environmental cooperation (Urpelainen 2011). The findings in this article suggest that neither type of enforcement is likely politically feasible if negotiations include all key emitters.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

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The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement

Aakre

2014

Int Environ Agreements

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To be effective, a post-Kyoto climate agreement must secure significant greenhouse gas emissions reductions by all (key) emitters. Potent participation and compliance enforcement will be required to make it in every key emitter's best interest to participate in, and comply with, an agreement which specifies deep emissions reductions for all its signatories. This article considers the conditions under which potent enforcement would likely be politically feasible. Based on assessments of the current political landscape, and on the sets of constraints that characterize negotiations over enforcement systems, the article firstly finds that neither type of enforcement would be politically feasible if agreement is sought among all key emitters. Secondly, because participation enforcement is perceived as less legitimate than compliance enforcement, the coalition of countries prepared to accept the former is likely smaller than the coalition prepared to accept the latter. Thirdly, participation enforcement likely places stricter requirements on the coalition's membership and size. Thus, while compliance enforcement should in principle always be politically feasible among some coalition, reaching agreement on participation enforcement is less likely. To the extent that participation enforcement is politically feasible, however, an agreement which enforces the cooperation of all key emitters may be attainable.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…Whether a policy proposal is acceptable to the negotiating IEAs often exhibit a gradual deepening of cooperation (Mitchell 2003). The theoretical literature on the enforcement of IEAs tends to ignore gradualist approaches to cooperation, and consequently fail to adequately explain how first best outcomes are attained (Urpelainen 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement

Aakre

2014

Int Environ Agreements

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“…If they were fully reversible, the fact that they were made prior to the negotiations would be completely irrelevant (Urpelainen 2011). The assumption of irreversibility is realistic, as the energy sector is subject to unusually high barriers to entry and path dependencies (Sandén and Azar 2005;Unruh 2000).…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Technology investment, bargaining, and international environmental agreements

Urpelainen

2011

Int Environ Agreements

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If countries are to engage in international environmental cooperation, they must bargain over the distribution of gains. When future bargaining over pollution abatement is expected, how should a country decide on public technology investments to reduce the domestic cost of pollution abatement? I find that while countries tend to underinvest because they fail to internalize the global benefits of new technology, the magnitude of the problem depends on a country's bargaining power. Powerful countries underinvest less frequently, because they expect to reap most of the global benefits from new technology in the international negotiations. I also investigate the effectiveness of a simple reciprocal technology agreement. I find that it can help solve the underinvestment problem, and this beneficial effect is particularly pronounced in the case of powerful countries. These findings imply that changing the bargaining protocol on climate change to the benefit of powerful countries may help secure the necessary technology investments.

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“…The expectation that the new institution would acquire support among third parties is also relevant for the equilibrium likelihood of a new multilateral institution's creation (Urpelainen, 2011). This support allows new institution to be effective on governance structure in some relevant issue areas.…”

Section: Direct and Indirect Benefits From The Creation Of New Multilmentioning

confidence: 99%

Çin’in Kurumsal Reforma Yönelik Stratejileri: AAYB’nin Kuruluşu ve Gelişimindeki Başarı

Tüter

2019

Ekonomi, Politika &Amp; Finans Araştırmaları Dergisi

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While existing studies largely focus on the implications of China-led new multilateral institutions to international order, the question of underlying reasons for the establishment of those institutions and their future development success have received less attention. China's strategies towards institutional reform are mainly based on its dissatiffaction with asymmetrical distributional gains within existing multilateral institutions such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). By using bargaining theory in international relations, this article contributes to explain the main conditions and mechanisms of the creation of Asian Infrasturucture Investment Bank (AIIB). In creating AIIB, China aims to increase its bargaining leverage which provides itself direct and indirect benefits visa -vis the costs emanating from intensified strategic competition with the US. Thus, it is argued that China's expectation of success reinforced by direct and indirect benefits for the development of AIIB reflects both the significant motivations underpinning its creation and also the possibility of extended institutional reform into other multilateral regimes. Within the context of power transition, the political bargaining process in reforming existing multilateral regimes is likely to be shaped by the tension between minilateralist strategies of rising powers and truly multilateral operations within newly emerging financial regime.

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Domestic reform as a rationale for gradualism in international cooperation

Cited by 8 publications

References 83 publications

The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement

The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement

Technology investment, bargaining, and international environmental agreements

Çin’in Kurumsal Reforma Yönelik Stratejileri: AAYB’nin Kuruluşu ve Gelişimindeki Başarı

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