The political feasibility of potent enforcement in a post-Kyoto climate agreement

Abstract

To be effective, a post-Kyoto climate agreement must secure significant greenhouse gas emissions reductions by all (key) emitters. Potent participation and compliance enforcement will be required to make it in every key emitter's best interest to participate in, and comply with, an agreement which specifies deep emissions reductions for all its signatories. This article considers the conditions under which potent enforcement would likely be politically feasible. Based on assessments of the current political landscape, and on the sets of constraints that characterize negotiations over enforcement systems, the article firstly finds that neither type of enforcement would be politically feasible if agreement is sought among all key emitters. Secondly, because participation enforcement is perceived as less legitimate than compliance enforcement, the coalition of countries prepared to accept the former is likely smaller than the coalition prepared to accept the latter. Thirdly, participation enforcement likely places stricter requirements on the coalition's membership and size. Thus, while compliance enforcement should in principle always be politically feasible among some coalition, reaching agreement on participation enforcement is less likely. To the extent that participation enforcement is politically feasible, however, an agreement which enforces the cooperation of all key emitters may be attainable.

Framework for the future? Exploring the possibility of majority voting in the climate negotiations

“…There are also benefits to a small group of countries moving forward exclusively, including first mover advantages and ''positive spillovers'' (Barker et al 2007) such as the development and diffusion of low-carbon technologies and diffusion of policies (Ovodenko and Keohane 2012;Busch et al 2005). Measures against Non-Parties, such as border tax adjustments, 7 could also deter free riding (Aakre 2014;Purvis and Stevenson 2010;Branger and Quirion 2014).…”

Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?

“…Clearly, all three will likely require unanimity among the negotiating parties. However, whereas incorporating incentives for compliance and against withdrawal will also require unanimity amongst the affected countries, incentives for ratification with deep commitments can be incorporated without requiring unanimity amongst affected countries ( [43], p. 4). Thus, even if an effective all-party climate agreement with potent enforcement mechanisms is politically infeasible in the UNFCCC context, a gradual approach to establishing an effective all-party agreement might nevertheless be feasible.…”

“…A possible way to proceed could be as follows: first negotiate a deep agreement with incentives for compliance and against withdrawal amongst an initial coalition of willing key actors, and then elicit the participation of reluctant countries (i.e., countries that would not have consented to the agreement, had they participated in negotiating it) by incorporating incentives to ratify with deep commitments ( [43], p. 4). Whether a country may be considered "key" in this context depends on two factors: the first is its share of global emissions, which reflects its significance in mitigating climate change.…”

“…However, the number of key actors could be even further restricted to include only China and the United States. Between them, they account for 42% of global CO 2 emissions [43] and more than 30% of world GDP [45]. If they were to agree on deep commitments to reduce GHG emissions and on potent mechanisms to enforce compliance, they would likely have the economic strength to induce reluctant countries to join, for instance by implementing trade restrictions against nonparticipants.…”

“…China's resistance to potent enforcement can in part be traced to concerns with preserving national sovereignty, and in part with a general reluctance to incorporating potent enforcement unless prospects for compliance are certain [51]. Regarding enforcement of ratification, the BASIC countries, including China, "are concerned that unilateral trade restrictions (i.e., any type of trade restriction not agreed on unanimously by all UNFCCC parties) will distort international trade, thereby undermining economic development in developing countries" ( [43], p. 15).…”