Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information

Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Orzach, Ram; Sela, Aner

doi:10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00018-6

Cited by 19 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…does not depend on the number of players. Einy et al (2002) prove that ( i ) i2N is a sophisticated equilibrium of G which interim Pareto-dominates all other sophisticated equilibria. The next lemma will be useful to compute expected payo¤s at the equilibrium .…”

Section: Sophisticated Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 88%

“…As in Einy et al (2002), let N = f1; :::; ng, n 2, be the set of bidders, be the …nite set of states of nature and p be a probability distribution on (w.l.o.g., p(!) > 0 for every !…”

Section: Auctions Without Collusion 21 Basic Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…We assume, as in Einy et al (2002), that the information partition i of every bidder i, i = 1; :::; n, is connected w.r.t. the common value function v, namely that, for every element…”

Section: Auctions Without Collusion 21 Basic Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…From Einy et al (2002) applied to G(P ) and lemma 2, R = max i2R i is a best response of ring R against ( S ) S2P;S6 =R . Applying once again lemma 2, N nR = max S2P;S6 =R S and proceeding as in (1),…”

Section: Proofmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, we somehow combine the two approaches and analyze the stability of rings in a general model of auctions with common values, which has been introduced by Einy et al (2002). As standard in information economics, the value of the fundamentals (namely, the common value of the object for sale here) depends on a state of nature and the private information of every agent is modeled by a partition of the set of states of nature.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values

Forges

Orzach

2011

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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SummaryIn a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is corestable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism. Keywords AbstractIn a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.

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Section: Sophisticated Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 88%

“…As in Einy et al (2002), let N = f1; :::; ng, n 2, be the set of bidders, be the …nite set of states of nature and p be a probability distribution on (w.l.o.g., p(!) > 0 for every !…”

Section: Auctions Without Collusion 21 Basic Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…We assume, as in Einy et al (2002), that the information partition i of every bidder i, i = 1; :::; n, is connected w.r.t. the common value function v, namely that, for every element…”

Section: Auctions Without Collusion 21 Basic Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Proofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values

Forges

Orzach

2011

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information

Malueg

Orzach

2011

Int J Game Theory

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We study a discrete common-value auction environment with two asymmetrically informed bidders. Equilibrium of the first-price auction is in mixed strategies, which we characterize using a doubly recursive solution method. The distribution of bids for the ex post strong player stochastically dominates that for the ex post weak player. This result complements Maskin and Riley's (Rev Econ Stud 67:413-438, 2000) similar result for asymmetric private-value auctions. Finally, comparison with the dominance-solvable equilibrium in a second-price auction shows the MilgromWeber (Econometrica 50: 1089-1122, 1982a) finding that the second-price auction yields at least as much revenue as the first-price auction fails with asymmetry: in some cases the first-price auction provides greater expected revenue, in some cases less.

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Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps

et al. 2015

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We study a class of two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over his opponent and both players are budget-constrained. We extend the results for all-pay auctions with complete information, and show that in our class of all-pay auctions with asymmetric information, sufficiently high (but still binding) bid caps do not change the players' expected total effort compared to the benchmark auction without any bid cap. Furthermore, we show that there are bid caps that increase the players' expected total effort compared to the benchmark. Finally, we demonstrate that there are bid caps which may have an unanticipated effect on the players' expected payoffs-one player's information advantage may turn into a disadvantage as far as his equilibrium payoff is concerned.

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Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information

Cited by 19 publications

References 7 publications

Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values

Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values

Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps

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