Summary.We study the core and competitive allocations in exchange economies with a continuum of traders and differential information. We show that if the economy is "irreducible", then a competitive equilibrium, in the sense of Radner (1968Radner ( , 1982, exists. Moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the "private core" (Yannelis, 1991). We also show that the "weak fine core" of an economy coincides with the set of competitive allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which the traders information is the joint information of all the traders in the original economy.

We study the relationship between the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations and the ex-post core of exchange economies with asymmetric information.

bin ya (d econ.haifa.ae.il We show that the fine core of an ato mIes s exchange economy with differential information is a subset of the ex-post core of the eeonomy. (This inc1usion may be proper, and it does not hold for economies with a finite number of traders.) Consequently, every fine eore allocation is a selection from the equilibrium eorrespondence of the associated family of full information economies. Moreover, when each trader knows his or her own utility funetion and his of her own endowment, every fine eore allocation is a rational expeetations equilibrium alloeation. Journal ol Economic Literature Classifieation Numbers: cn, 050.

No abstract

It is shown that each semivalue (bounded semivalue) on the class SG of monotonic simple games with a finite support can be uniquely extended to a semivalue (continuous semivalue) on the class G of all games with a finite support. We use this to show that the formula that is given for semivalues (continuous semivalues) on G by Dubey, Neyman and Weber also holds for semivalues (bounded semivalues) on SG. We also derive another formula for semivalues on SG (in terms of the minimal winning coalitions of the game).