Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment

Abstract

After sixty-five years of pursuing a grand strategy of global leadership—nearly a third of which transpired without a peer great power rival—has the time come for the United States to switch to a strategy of retrenchment? According to most security studies scholars who write on the future of U.S. grand strategy, the answer is an unambiguous yes: they argue that the United States should curtail or eliminate its overseas military presence, abolish or dramatically reduce its global security commitments, and minimize or eschew efforts to foster and lead the liberal institutional order. Thus far, the arguments for retrenchment have gone largely unanswered by international relations scholars. An evaluation of these arguments requires a systematic analysis that directly assesses the core claim of retrenchment advocates that the current “deep engagement” grand strategy is not in the national interests of the United States. This analysis shows that advocates of retrenchment radically overestimate the costs of deep engagement and underestimate its benefits. We conclude that the fundamental choice to retain a grand strategy of deep engagement after the Cold War is just what the preponderance of international relations scholarship would expect a rational, self-interested leading power in America's position to do.

Why do secondary states choose to support, follow or challenge?

“…9 What we are calling 'high engagement' is sometimes referred to as deep engagement or forward engagement. See, for example, Brooks et al (2013), Brooks et al (2012Brooks et al ( /2013. 10 Low engagement can also be understood as selective engagement or offshore balancing.…”

“…In fact, the United States engages in soft balancing against other states. As an example, 'In 2011 Washington coordinated action with a number of Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by highlighting established international law and norms to deny China's claim legitimacy' (Brooks et al, 2012(Brooks et al, /2013. Similarly, according to Blarel and Ebert (2015), in South Asia, the United States had significant interest in de-escalating the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, using a pivotal deterrence strategy to influence the strategic choices of the regional states.…”

Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing

“…6 In Europe and East Asia, these commitments took shape formally and quite early in the post-war period, with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a system of interlocking alliances in the Asia-Pacific. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. presence and guarantees developed more gradually, and with a lower public profile.…”

Beyond the ‘RtoP’: Responsibility as doing, being and sharing

“…Unclear or dysfunctional division of responsibilities within military organizations, state bureaucracies and organizations is another scholarly concern (Bovcon, 2011;Rapport, 2012;Farrell and Giustozzi, 2013;Karlsrud, 2013;Kathman, 2013;Meyer, 2013). While many scholars focus on the challenges inherent in the sharing of responsibilities, opportunities are considered as well when it comes to sharing among allies and partners (Tierney, 2011;Brooks et al, 2012). Particular attention is directed toward the sharing of responsibilities within NATO (Yost, 2009(Yost, , 2011Hallams and Schreer, 2012).…”