In this article we examine when and why secondary and tertiary states select a strategy that does not entail following the lead of the rising states. To address these questions we outline a simple model that examines systemic and sub-systemic (regional) constraints on and opportunities for secondary and tertiary states: how engaged in the region is the global hegemon, how many rising (and extra-regional) states are in the region, and which states are waxing and waning and by how much. These three characteristics create different opportunities for and constraints on secondary and tertiary states, which in turn influence the set of strategy choices of these states as they respond to the regional hegemon. Our model cannot account for the specific foreign policy strategies that secondary and tertiary states select. Such a model would require domestic and individual level variables. We leave it to the area specialists and experts in the following articles in the volume to introduce these variables and explain the specific strategies used. Instead, based on our model we can explain general tendencies toward accommodative strategies, resistance strategies and neutral strategies. It is important to note that secondary and tertiary states can use a mix of different strategies toward regional and global hegemons, such as resisting primary threats and accommodating secondary threats. Moreover, secondary and tertiary states are often engaged in multiple games -a strategy might appear to be costly and suboptimal at one level but reasonable and optimal at another level. Finally, in selecting a strategy secondary and tertiary states factor the systemic, subsystemic and domestic costs of the alternative strategies.

Realist and liberal paradigms of foreign policy analysis offer different views of the important policy stance of neutrality. Realism explains a neutral stance as the rational calculation of a small state’s interests in the state-centered, unfriendly, self-help environment. Liberalism argues that international norms and internal dynamics lead nations to seek and maintain neutrality. This article explores the neutral foreign policy stance of the Republic of Ireland from 1938 to the present in comparison to Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. The Irish policy of neutrality differs from the other European neutrals in two important ways: it is unarmed neutrality and it is not impartial neutrality. I argue that domestic actors, public opinion, and governmental decision-making institutions provide an explanation for the continuing stance of neutrality. Thus, liberalism provides a better explanation for Irish neutrality than realism. The value of this study is that it illustrates in a comparative perspective the varying sources of neutrality in Europe and points to the continued usefulness of varied perspectives in understanding historical and contemporary foreign policy.

South Korea enjoyed high rates of economic growth until the mid–1990s. However in mid–1997 the country went into a severe economic crisis which ultimately resulted in a request for an IMF bailout. Leading up to the crisis, the government had embarked upon democratic liberalization but not much economic liberalization. This research explores why the government would lay the foundation for political reform without creating institutions capable of imposing economic reform on the politically powerful business sector. The absence of such institutions put the government in a position where it could not respond to the emerging economic crisis. The government’s inability to act eroded its own position of power and governance. From this perspective, the government’s inattention to economic reform appears irrational as it led to a weakening of its own position. We build a model of political and economic liberalization showing that the government was engaged in nested games (i.e., games in multiple arenas) with the political opposition, the labor unions, and the powerful business sector. We develop an argument that strong, antiliberal economic actors create incentive for the government in a democratizing state to refrain from economic liberalization, even while moving forward with democratic liberalization.

Nationalist and ethnic conflicts are a continuing source of tension in the post-Cold War period. The underlying factors affecting such conflicts are threat perception, ethnic security dilemmas, and lack of trust between nationalist/ethnic groups. The challenge is to find solutions to these conflicts. International institutions can establish trust and reduce the ethnic security dilemma by providing multiple forums of representation, promoting overlapping identities, and pooling sovereignty. Pooling sovereignty across a number of international representative bodies leads to increased access to governmental policymaking, with each party having a stake in government, and leads to a reduction in political tension and conflict. Thus, international parliamentary institutions may provide a solution to these conflicts. The British-Irish Peace Agreement (Good Friday Agreement) of 1998 is examined as an illustration of this argument.

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