Don’t stop believing

Carr, Jennifer Rose

doi:10.1080/00455091.2015.1123454

Cited by 14 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…(See, for example, [Seidenfeld, 1994], [Stalnaker, 1999]). Recently, several philosophers have addressed this question directly; see, for example: [Carr, 2015], [Ferrero, 2012[Ferrero, , 2008, [Hedden, 2015b,a], [Meacham, 2010b], [Moss, 2013].…”

Section: Time-slice Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?

Doody¹

2019

Res Phil.

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Section: Time-slice Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 See [Hedden, 2015a], [Moss, 2013], and [Carr, 2015] for more discussion on the motivation internalism provides for Time-Slice Rationality. I think the most helpful way to see the point is to focus on the so-called "action-guiding" role of the rational 'ought.'…”

Section: Time-slice Rationalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?

Doody¹

2019

Res Phil.

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“…Paul goes on to suggest that, because temptation pre-2 I am presuming in this discussion that diachronic norms of rationality govern our resolutions, such that something goes wrong with you if you abandon your resolution without good reason. There is currently a live philosophical debate about whether irreducibly diachronic norms of (epistemic and/or practical) rationality exist (for example, see Christensen 2000, Ferrero 2012, Hedden 2015and Moss 2015 for arguments that no such norms exist, and Bratman 1987, Holton 2009, Broome 2013, Hlobil 2015and Carr 2016 for arguments that they do). However, I do not need to delve into this debate for present purposes, since one could translate Holton's (and my) claims about the stability of resolutions into a "timeslice rationality" framework that denies the existence of irreducible diachronic norms of practical rationality.…”

Section: The Efficacy Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reconsidering Resolutions

Liberman¹

2017

JESP

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In Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Richard Holton lays out a detailed account of resolutions, arguing that they enable agents to resist temptation. Holton claims that temptation often leads to inappropriate shifts in judgment, and that resolutions are a special kind of first- and second-order intention pair that blocks such judgment shift. In this paper, I elaborate upon an intuitive but underdeveloped objection to Holton’s view – namely, that his view does not enable agents to successfully block the transmission of temptation in the way that he claims, because the second-order intention is as equally susceptible to temptation as the first-order intention alone would be. I appeal to independently compelling principles – principles that Holton should accept, because they help fill an important explanatory gap in his account – to demonstrate why this objection succeeds. This argument both shows us where Holton’s view goes wrong and points us to the kind of solu-tion we need. In conclusion, I sketch an alternative account of resolutions as a first-order intention paired with a second-order desire. I argue that my account is not susceptible to the same objection because a temptation that cannot be blocked by an intention can be blocked by a desire.

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“…But both Moss and Meacham are motivated by different kinds of considerations than Hedden. For a defense of diachronic credence constraints, see Carr (2016). is a subject's initial credence function, (ii) an ur-prior function can be any function which bears the right relations to a subject's credences and evidence over time, and (iii) the ur-prior function is a function representing the subject's evidential standards.…”

Section: Ur-prior Conditionalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization

Meacham¹

2016

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Conditionalization is a widely endorsed rule for updating one's beliefs. But a sea of complaints have been raised about it, including worries regarding how the rule handles error correction, changing desiderata of theory choice, evidence loss, self-locating beliefs, learning about new theories, and confirmation. In light of such worries, a number of authors have suggested replacing Conditionalization with a different ruleone that appeals to what I'll call ur-priors. But different authors have understood the rule in different ways, and these different understandings solve different problems. In this paper, I aim to map out the terrain regarding these issues. I survey the different problems that might motivate the adoption of such a rule, flesh out the different understandings of the rule that have been proposed, and assess their pros and cons. I conclude by suggesting that one particular batch of proposals, proposals that appeal to what I'll call loaded evidential standards, are especially promising.

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Don’t stop believing

Cited by 14 publications

References 17 publications

If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?

If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?

Reconsidering Resolutions

Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization

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