Reconsidering Resolutions

Abstract

In Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Richard Holton lays out a detailed account of resolutions, arguing that they enable agents to resist temptation. Holton claims that temptation often leads to inappropriate shifts in judgment, and that resolutions are a special kind of first- and second-order intention pair that blocks such judgment shift. In this paper, I elaborate upon an intuitive but underdeveloped objection to Holton’s view – namely, that his view does not enable agents to successfully block the transmission of temptation in the way that he claims, because the second-order intention is as equally susceptible to temptation as the first-order intention alone would be. I appeal to independently compelling principles – principles that Holton should accept, because they help fill an important explanatory gap in his account – to demonstrate why this objection succeeds. This argument both shows us where Holton’s view goes wrong and points us to the kind of solu-tion we need. In conclusion, I sketch an alternative account of resolutions as a first-order intention paired with a second-order desire. I argue that my account is not susceptible to the same objection because a temptation that cannot be blocked by an intention can be blocked by a desire.

Customised Institutional Experiences’ Use in Curbing Unwanted Occupational Incidents and Accidents

“…The population was nine and the researchers used a census recruitment method as they included all the OHS officers in the study sample. The census method is when all elements of the population are included in the study [15]. The size of FGDs is usually informed, inter alia, by the type of participants [19].…”

On the Rationality of Vow‐making

“…For more on the role of resolutions in enabling us to resist temptation by preventing us from overhastily revising our intentions, see Holton (). See also Liberman () for a criticism of (and alternative to) Holton's account.…”