Donations as an incentive for cooperation in public good games

Butz, Britta; Harbring, Christine

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2019.101510

Cited by 9 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 45 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The results show that a donation to a charitable organization that is subsidized by the experimenter leads to a significant rise in contributions compared to the baseline treatment. Additionally, donations that are financed by the public good itself can compensate for a lower efficiency level [6]. Building upon these findings, we conducted a laboratory experiment in order to analyze the effect of identity disclosure in a repeated public good game with charitable donations tied to the public good.…”

Section: Combining a Social Dilemma And Charitable Givingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The instructions stated that 80% of their doubled team contributions would be equally spread among them. Note that the comparison of Base, IntDon, and ExtDon were the focus of Butz and Harbring 2020 [6]-the results are described in Section 2.4.…”

Section: Treatmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Also, Butz and Harbring (2020), as well as Kajackaite and Sliwka (2017), indicate that reciprocal altruists might be one subgroup that supports positive effects when donations are used as an incentive. Reciprocal altruists are individuals that reciprocate towards the altruistic preferences of other individuals [6,54].…”

Section: Descriptive and Nonparametric Statisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We introduced donations that were proportionally linked to the amount of public good contributions and were either subsidized by the experimenter (externally financed) or paid by the team members' contributions (internally financed). The results of a first experiment based on this setting reveal that contributions rise significantly when donations are tied to the public good [6]. Building upon this design, we examine the effect of announcing the team members' identities on contribution levels, which is implemented by calling each group's participants into one room after the experiment finished.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The Effect of Disclosing Identities in a Socially Incentivized Public Good Game

Butz

Harbring

2021

Games

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We investigate whether revealing the identities in a public good game that includes a donation incentive leads to higher contributions to the public good. Previous evidence suggests that contributions to a public good increase significantly when these take place in public. Also, the amount of money given in charitable donations seems to be sensitive to the revealing of identities. Using a laboratory experiment, we implement a 20% donation share that is dependent on participants’ contributions to a public good. The donation is either costless (because it is financed by the experimenter) or deducted from a team’s contributions. In both settings, we explore whether informing participants that group members’ identities will be disclosed at the end of the experiment leads to higher contributions to the public good. Non-parametric statistics indicate that when donations are costly for the participants, the announcement of subsequent identity disclosure results in significantly higher contributions in the second half of the repeated public good game. In contrast, revealing identities in settings with costless donations reduces contributions to the public good significantly. The regression results indicate that conditional cooperators might be one subgroup driving these results.

show abstract

Section: Combining a Social Dilemma And Charitable Givingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Treatmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Descriptive and Nonparametric Statisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Effect of Disclosing Identities in a Socially Incentivized Public Good Game

Butz

Harbring

2021

Games

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…An increase in productivity was shown in a real effort experiment when donations were provided as incentives [ 27 ]. Most recently, two variations of donation incentives were examined in public goods games, with significantly higher contributions when donations were financed by the experimenter as well as an increase in productivity when financed by the subjects themselves [ 28 ]. Additionally, a difference in contributions when comparing donations to social versus non-social projects was shown, further implying a clear trend in positive effects for social incentives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric effects of social and economic incentives on cooperation in real effort based public goods games

Hackel¹,

Yamamoto

Okada

et al. 2021

PLoS ONE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many practitioners as well as researchers explore promoting environmentally conscious behavior in the context of public goods systems. Numerous experimental studies revealed various types of incentives to increase cooperation on public goods. There is ample evidence that monetary and non-monetary incentives, such as donations, have a positive effect on cooperation in public goods games that exceeds fully rational and optimal economic decision making. Despite an accumulation of these studies, in the typical setting of these experiments participants decide on an allocation of resources to a public pool, but they never exert actual effort. However, in reality, we often observe that players’ real effort is required in these public goods game situations. Therefore, more analysis is needed to draw conclusions for a wider set of incentive possibilities in situations similar to yet deviating from resource allocation games. Here we construct a real effort public goods game in an online experiment and statistically analyze the effect different types of incentives have on cooperation. In our experiment, we examine combinations of monetary and social incentives in a setting aimed closer to practical realities, such as financial costs and real effort forming part of the decision to cooperate on a public good. In our real effort public goods game participants cooperate and defect on image-scoring tasks. We find that in our setting economic and social incentives produce an asymmetric effect. Interestingly economic incentives decreased the share of highly uncooperative participants, while social incentives raised the share of highly cooperative participants.

show abstract

Incentives for cooperation in groups: sociality meets decision rights

Butz,

Alvarez,

Harbring

2023

Rev Manag Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of their donation. An up to 20% donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20% of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 and 20%. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. In groups voting in favor of a 20% donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment contributions to the public good are higher compared to an exogenously implemented donation share.

show abstract

Donations as an incentive for cooperation in public good games

Cited by 9 publications

References 45 publications

The Effect of Disclosing Identities in a Socially Incentivized Public Good Game

The Effect of Disclosing Identities in a Socially Incentivized Public Good Game

Asymmetric effects of social and economic incentives on cooperation in real effort based public goods games

Incentives for cooperation in groups: sociality meets decision rights

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About