2018
DOI: 10.3386/w24585
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Douglass C. North: Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and Economic Outcomes

Abstract: Thanks for very useful comments from Mary Shirley of the Coase Institute. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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Cited by 7 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…However, it is found a weak negative correlation between economic growth and natural resource rent. This aligns with recent studies addressing how the economy can grow under the pressure of sustainability efforts (Libecap, 2018;Waldo et al, 2016).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 87%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, it is found a weak negative correlation between economic growth and natural resource rent. This aligns with recent studies addressing how the economy can grow under the pressure of sustainability efforts (Libecap, 2018;Waldo et al, 2016).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 87%
“…Waldo et al (2016) conclude that implementing regulatory instruments for externalities in Nordic countries may have a significant effect on economic performance. Meanwhile, Libecap (2018), from a broader perspective, argues that the economic welfare losses for addressing externalities are mostly due to hidden transaction costs for the political process. Addressing externalities in the policies is, however, multifaceted.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Efforts to regulate groundwater and other common-pool resources can be susceptible to capture or obstruction by narrow interests [26]. From an institutional and resource economics perspective, the potential for groundwater governance may be affected by potential benefits and costs, including transaction costs; the ability to observe groundwater use, impacts, and boundaries; number and heterogeneity of users; and the complexity and availability of information about aquifers, recharge, and other stocks and flows [27,28].…”
Section: Difficulties In Groundwater Governancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conceptually, this could also be seen as incremental steps toward partial "unitization" of a common pool resource. In the oil and gas industry in the western United States, larger-scale cooperation has been supported by legislation for unified management of oil fields by a single operator or coordinated operation of wells under shared rules [26,50]. Ideally, extraction and other activities can be managed in ways that are more efficient and avoid damage from a "race to the pump" including conflicts between neighbouring users and compaction that permanently loses storage capacity in the aquifer.…”
Section: Sharing Wells Pumps and Pipesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, this also reflects the fact that ultimately water rights (and sometimes related ones such as those for agricultural land and fishing), water management institutions, water boards, social norms, etc., select the spatial and temporal definitions. Theoretical and practical cases in which water resource governance (the system and structure for allocating and protecting water) is underpinned by law and other institutional regulation can be found in, e.g., [60][61][62][63][64]. Water Boards are, for example, organizations that also affect the de facto water availability, and other choices confronting management.…”
Section: 2 Towards Representing Water Heterogeneity and Its Endowmentioning
confidence: 99%