Doxa and Epistêmê as Modes of Acquaintance in Republic V

Szaif, Jan

doi:10.4000/etudesplatoniciennes.915

Cited by 23 publications

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“…13 I thank N. Baima for pointing this difficulty out to me. On this passage, see also (Szaif 2007). 14 (Szaif 2007), esp.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 86%

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Thumos and doxa as intermediates in the Republic

Renaut¹

2018

Plato Journal

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Broadly speaking, something can be called intermediate for Plato insofar as it occupies a place between two objects, poles, places, time, or principles. But this broad meaning of the intermediate has been eclipsed by the Aristotelian critique of the intermediate objects of the dianoia, so that it has become more difficult to think of the intermediates as functions of the soul. The aim of this paper is to show how, in the Republic, thumos is analogously treated as an intermediate with other kinds of intermediate objects, and tentatively to relate this psychological intermediate in a broader theory with doxa, as its epistemological ground in the course of action.

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“…13 I thank N. Baima for pointing this difficulty out to me. On this passage, see also (Szaif 2007). 14 (Szaif 2007), esp.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…On this passage, see also (Szaif 2007). 14 (Szaif 2007), esp. §54 58, who rightly insists on the link between the transient mode of acquaintance of doxa, and the possibility, nevertheless, for doxa to be a possible transition towards understanding.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 86%

Thumos and doxa as intermediates in the Republic

Renaut¹

2018

Plato Journal

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“…40 The commentary here is a series of questions about particular words from Plato's text, indicating that their sense is mysterious. 41 Some argue that since perceptibles are images of Forms, in having doxa in response to perceptibles we are ipso facto having doxa about the Forms (see LaFrance 1981, 141-2, Smith 2000, and Szaif 2007. I suggest that Plato was not thinking of this view, and that its main support comes from alleged textual evidence for doxa of Forms, support I hope to have undermined.…”

Section: Endnotementioning

confidence: 99%

Plato'sDoxa

Moss¹

2020

Philosophical Books

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Plato is often regarded as a founding father of modern epistemology, the first to develop theories of knowledge and belief. Recent work has complicated this picture by showing that epistêmê, the superior kind in his epistemology, is strikingly different from contemporary epistemology's knowledge and perhaps has more in common with what we now call understanding. 1 What about the inferior kind in Plato's epistemology, however-doxa? As one can see from standard translations, explicit discussions, and tacit assumptions, it is widely held that here Plato really is talking about just what we talk about now: belief. The aim of this paper is to show that Plato's doxa is very different from belief. It is a special kind of phenomenon, something which has no clear counterpart in contemporary epistemology, but which Plato thought absolutely central both to epistemology and to ethics: cognition of what seems. 2 Three important notes before I begin. First, this is not a paper about the meaning of the word 'doxa' in Plato. I am not trying to capture every use of that word, nor am I confining my attention to contexts in which Plato uses that word. I aim to show that we can find in his writings a developed theory of a specific kind of cognition, something which he usually refers to as doxa-although he sometimes refers to it using other terms (such as 'pistis' at Gorgias 454d or Timaeus 29c), and although he occasionally uses 'doxa' to refer to other phenomena, including, arguably, belief (see section 9). Second, I will focus on Plato's account of doxa in the so-called middle dialogues, especially the Republic, Phaedo, and Timaeus, for it is here that I think the account most developed, although it has clear roots in the earlier dialogues, and survives in some form in the later. 3 Finally, although I want to show that Plato thinks of doxa very differently from how people nowadays think of belief, I will not try to show that doxa is not belief. I can imagine an interesting argument that the phenomenon I will describe is belief, conceived very differently from how we conceive it today. I do hope however to show that the differences are radical enough and fundamental enough that it is not fruitful to study Plato's doxa by beginning from the assumption that it is belief. We should not use our theories and intuitions about belief to guide or constrain our interpretations of doxa. If we do, we not only create problems for Plato's texts where there are none, we also miss out on features of his epistemology that are revealing, compelling, and very different from our own.

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“…Doxa is a conformist conception of thought that is expressed in popular opinions and common belief, which are based on the most banal act of everyday thinking: the principle of communication. In Republic, Plato placed doxa between 'knowledge' (gnôsis/epistêmê) and 'ignorance' (agnôsia), 'an intermediate state which is not knowledge but at least provides some starting-points in the quest for real understanding' (Szaif, 2007 In a bid to answer these questions, it is instructive to consider the origins of the term 'resistance'.…”

Section: Resisting 'Dogmatic Images Of Thought'mentioning

confidence: 99%