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The chapter starts off with an analysis of the pre-philosophical usage of truth terminology in ancient Greek, followed by a brief survey of some relevant conceptual developments in the pre-Socratic and Sophistic literature. This serves as a foil for the analysis of the various usages of truth terminology in Plato’s metaphysics and epistemology of “Forms.” Whereas truth is here conceived primarily as a quality of the objects of scientific knowledge, the chapter then also describes the development of a theory of falsehood and truth as qualities of assertions or beliefs in some of Plato’s late works. The section on Aristotle addresses his theory of the declarative sentence, his analysis of propositional truth and falsehood, his theory of the underlying “truth-making” relations, and his ontology of truth-makers. Finally, the chapter also discusses whether the approach we find in Aristotle should be classified as a correspondence theory of truth.

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