Dual-fairness supply chain with quantity discount contracts

Nie, Tengfei; Du, Shaofu

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2016.08.051

Cited by 196 publications

(120 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…So, we introduce a certain coordination mechanism to the supply chain in the decentralized decision mode. For the traditional supply chain, many scholars have designed coordination mechanisms and realized Pareto improvement based on various contracts, i.e., revenue-sharing contracts [50] and quantity discount contracts [51]. In this paper, based on the theoretical knowledge of coordination, we propose a "Commission Fee Readjusting and Cost Sharing (hereafter called CFRCS)" contract to achieve coordination.…”

Section: Coordination Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision and Coordination in a Low-Carbon E-Supply Chain Considering the Manufacturer’s Carbon Emission Reduction Behavior

Han

Wang

2018

Sustainability

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At present, online shopping is becoming increasingly popular. In particular, low-carbon products are becoming more favored as consumers' low-carbon awareness increases. Manufacturers sell their low-carbon products through e-commerce platforms. Thus, the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform form a low-carbon e-supply chain system. The manufacturer makes products with carbon emission reduction efforts, while the e-commerce platform provides a sales service. In this paper, we described models for a decentralized decision mode and a centralized decision mode in the low-carbon e-supply chain, and compare the decision results. Our findings show that the centralized decision mode has a better performance than the decentralized one, the ability of the e-supply chain to respond to consumers' preference for a low-carbon product has a direct effect on its operation, and the manufacturer's carbon emission reduction behavior will be a potential source for enterprises to gain more revenue. Further, we designed a coordination contract for them that can be accepted by both sides in the decentralized decision mode. We find that if the e-commerce platform can share the carbon emission reduction costs of the manufacturer, the performance of the e-supply chain will be greatly improved. A practical case study and numerical examples validate our analysis.

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Section: Coordination Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision and Coordination in a Low-Carbon E-Supply Chain Considering the Manufacturer’s Carbon Emission Reduction Behavior

Han

Wang

2018

Sustainability

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“…Besides, the goal of the coordination contract in Section 4 was to allow supply chain performance to achieve the optimal situation under complete rationality. Hence, the benchmark was kept under complete rationality [8,26]. However, the only goal was to maximize the overall profitability of the supply chain by determining the optimal order quantity q and sales effort e. Previous studies proved that when decision makers were entirely rational, the equilibrium solutions of Complexity the centralized supply chain were always better than the decentralized behavioral supply chain [27,28].…”

Section: Centralized Supply Chain Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Figures 4 and 5 validate the result in Section 5 when μ � 0, β � 0; hence, the retailer had the negative utility of unfair aversion. erefore, according to equation (8), when the retailer had fairness concern only, his utility function was corrected to…”

Section: Centralized Supply Chain Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In order to solve this problem, various coordinating contracts were proposed in different supply chain structures. However, coordinating conditions and the degrees of difficulty during coordination changes depend on behavioral factors [8]. Among many different types of contracts, combined contract, i.e., the combination of two or more contracts, has received widespread attention and proved to be effective in resolving these conflicts [9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

et al. 2020

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The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

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“…Studies of social preferences are mainly concerned with the field of supply chain management, and most of these focus on difference aversion preferences. [33]; Wu and Niederhoff (2014) studied the impact of fairness concerns on supply chain performance in a two-party newsvendor setting [34]; Li and Jain (2016) studied the impact of consumers' fairness concerns on firms' behavior-based pricing strategies, profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare [35]; Qin et al (2016) investigated how fairness concerns influence supply chain decision-making, while examining the effect of private production cost information and touching on issues related to bounded rationality [36]; Choi and Messinger (2016) found that fairness has a significant role in competitive supply chain relationships, even in a scenario that is designed to favor one member of the supply chain over others [37]; Nie and Du (2017) considered dual fairness in a distribution channel with quantity discount contracts [38]; and incorporated the members' fairness preference and bargaining power into the product quality and pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain [39].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiation for Time Optimization in Construction Projects with Competitive and Social Welfare Preferences

Meng

et al. 2019

Complexity

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Construction time optimization is affected greatly by the negotiation between owners and contractors, whose progress is dictated by their desire to maximize system revenues. This paper builds an agent-based model and designs an experimental scenario in which the contractor has competitive and social welfare preferences relevant to the Chinese context; we subdivide competitive preference into greed and jealousy components and subdivide social welfare preference into generosity and sympathy components. We analyze the impacts of these different contractor preferences on the revenue-sharing coefficient, negotiation success rate, and negotiation time when negotiation reaches agreement. The results show that the jealousy component of competitive preference has an important influence on improving the income of the subject, while the greed component does not significantly enhance the revenue-sharing coefficient. The sympathy component of social welfare preference does not have an influence on the revenue-sharing coefficient no matter the strength of the generosity component. Increasing the greed component of competitive preference will lead to the extension of negotiation time and, to a certain extent, to the reduction of the negotiation success rate; the sympathy component of social welfare preference does not have an influence on negotiation time no matter the strength of the generosity preference.

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Dual-fairness supply chain with quantity discount contracts

Cited by 196 publications

References 25 publications

Decision and Coordination in a Low-Carbon E-Supply Chain Considering the Manufacturer’s Carbon Emission Reduction Behavior

Decision and Coordination in a Low-Carbon E-Supply Chain Considering the Manufacturer’s Carbon Emission Reduction Behavior

Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Negotiation for Time Optimization in Construction Projects with Competitive and Social Welfare Preferences

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