Dualization and Electoral Realignment

Häusermann, Silja

doi:10.1017/psrm.2018.48

Cited by 25 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Our results provide novel empirical support for Häusermann’s ( 2020 ) original argument that globalization losers and outsiders are conceptually and empirically separate groups. Tabular analysis clarifies that unemployment and atypical employment do not affect individuals working in offshorable sectors more than those working in sheltered sectors.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 75%

“…Indeed, the (few) studies that connect the two processes implicitly or explicitly tend to consider globalization losers as roughly congruent with outsiders (e.g. Lubbers et al 2002 ; King & Rueda 2008 ), a thesis that is explicitly contested by Häusermann ( 2020 , p. 381). Moreover, it is unclear whether the offshorability risk on the one hand, and the atypical employment and unemployment risks on the other hand, are associated, so that being exposed to increasing economic competition increases the probability of being hired under atypical or temporary contracts or of being unemployed.…”

Section: New Divides and Risks In Post-industrial And Globalized Econ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Disentangling (new) labour market divides: outsiders’ and globalization losers’ socio-economic risks in Europe

Natili

Negri

2022

Qual Quant

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In post-industrial and globalized economies, socio-economic risks have become ubiquitous for workers. Two segments of the labour force seem particularly exposed: namely, outsiders (atypical workers and unemployed individuals) and globalization losers (unskilled workers in offshorable employment sectors), with relevant consequences for party competition in Europe. The coexistence of these two segments of vulnerable workers has brought conceptual ambiguity. Using the original 2019 REScEU Mass Survey on ten European countries, we firstly clarify that outsiders and globalization losers do not constitute the same socio-economic group. Secondly, we look into the micro-foundations of outsiders’ and globalization losers’ redistributive preferences and political behaviours by showing that outsiderness, rather than exposure to international competition, constitutes a significant driver of income and employment insecurities, and of dependency on social protection and family financial aid.

show abstract

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 75%

Section: New Divides and Risks In Post-industrial And Globalized Econ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Disentangling (new) labour market divides: outsiders’ and globalization losers’ socio-economic risks in Europe

Natili

Negri

2022

Qual Quant

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Liberal parties on the green, left and right increasingly compete for the votes of these centrist and professional salaried urban groups, with liberal centre-right parties claiming the lion's share of votes from higher earning voters (Oesch & Rennwald, 2018). This has led to a large research agenda on who is mobilising lower earning voters (Häusermann, 2020), and what this means for the future of social democratic parties (Benedetto, Hix, & Mastrorocco, 2020).…”

Section: Explaining Left/right Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Irish voters moving to the left?

Müller

Regan

2021

Irish Political Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Irish party system has been an outlier in comparative politics. Ireland never had a left-right divide in parliament, and for decades, the dominant centrist political parties competed around a centre-right policy agenda. The absence of an explicit left-right divide in party competition suggested that Irish voters, on average, occupy centre-right policy preferences. Combining survey data since 1973 and all Irish election studies between 2002 and 2020, we show that the average Irish voter now leans to the centre-left. We also show that income has recently emerged as a predictor of left-right self-placement, and that left-right positions increasingly structure vote choice. These patterns hold when using policy preferences on taxes, spending, and government interventions to reduce inequality as alternative indicators. We outline potential explanations for this leftward shift, and conclude that these developments might be anchored in economic inequalities and the left populist strategies of Sinn Féin.

show abstract

“…Given that, as we have shown, many dualizing reforms were actively promoted by the centre‐left as a way to surpass union's opposition to liberalization, it is plausible that such workers blamed traditional centre‐left for their condition and either reverted to so‐called populist parties (e.g. Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019) or, more simply, disenfranchised themselves (as shown recently by Häusermann, 2020), thereby reducing the representation capacity of the political systems and, a fortiori , its ability to address those concerns.…”

Section: Discussion: Unions and Partisanship In Europementioning

confidence: 78%

Labour market liberalization and the rise of dualism in Europe as the interplay between governments, trade unions and the economy

Simoni

Vlandas

2020

Soc Policy Adm

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Why have labour market reforms varied so much across European countries in the 30 years preceding the economic crisis? We argue that the degree of liberalization over time in each country depends on the interaction between governments' partisan leaning, the strength of trade unions and the economic problem‐load pushing governments to adopt distinct labour market reform strategies. Building on existing literature, we interpret ‘dualizing’ labour market reforms as weaker forms of liberalization and test our argument on the cross‐national variation in over 200 labour market reforms carried out in 14 western European countries between 1985 and 2007. Our empirical results show that governments are less likely to liberalize if they face a strong union movement and the economic problem‐load is low. However, even in countries with strong unions, opposition may not always manage to block change. First, as unemployment becomes more severe, unions' ability to reduce the likelihood of liberalization strongly decreases. Second, trade unions often do not manage to prevent liberalization advanced by social democratic governments. Third, governments can devise three (non‐rival) strategies to deflect opposition: (1) they can re‐regulate parts of the labour market to protect certain workers from liberalization; (2) generous unemployment benefits can cushion the costs of liberalization, thereby increasing its likelihood; and (3) they can carry out two‐tier reforms to insulate insider (unionized) workers employed in permanent contracts, which limits union opposition. By identifying the complex interactions between variables that explain variation in labour market liberalization across European countries, this article contributes to our understanding of the evolution of European political economy.

show abstract

Dualization and Electoral Realignment

Cited by 25 publications

References 18 publications

Disentangling (new) labour market divides: outsiders’ and globalization losers’ socio-economic risks in Europe

Disentangling (new) labour market divides: outsiders’ and globalization losers’ socio-economic risks in Europe

Are Irish voters moving to the left?

Labour market liberalization and the rise of dualism in Europe as the interplay between governments, trade unions and the economy

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About