Duopoly Competition Between Chauffeured Car and Taxi: An Analysis of Pricing and Market Segmentation

Yang, Tong; Wu, Jiangning; Wang, Jian‐Jun

doi:10.21078/jssi-2017-511-13

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 11 publications

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“…8,9 The uniform pricing mode was provided for the governmental guidance and only regulated the fixed price. 10,11 Because the taxi market was motivated by temporally non-stationary demand and supply, the uniform and single price was unable to adapt to the supply and demand dynamics. 12 It also restricts market competition and weakens the price adjustment for the equilibrium of demand and supply.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic pricing model for cruising taxicab based on system dynamics

Jin

Liu

et al. 2019

Advances in Mechanical Engineering

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The cruising taxi industry has been greatly impacted by the development of the ride-hailing taxi services like the Didi and Uber. The service orders of cruising taxis fell 35% or more. To intervene the conflicts between the cruising and ride-hailing taxis, system dynamics model of cruising taxicab price was proposed by considering the competitive relationships between online ride-hailing and cruising taxis. The proposed model was calibrated and validated by the taxi operational data in Ningbo. Simulation experiments were designed to explore the impact of the cruising taxi price changes on the balance of market supply and demand. Simulations were divided into two scenarios: one was under the different levels of supply and demand at peak and low peak; the other was under the different proportions of ride-hailing taxi. The results indicate that (1) the market supply and demand are close to equilibrium during peak hours when the price increases by U0.6 per kilometer. The increased price can reduce the peak demand level effectively and also increase the total earning of cruising taxis; (2) when the service order ratio of cruising taxis to ride-hailing taxis accounts for about 10:4.5 and 10:8, the price increases by U0.6 per kilometer and decreases by U0.4 per kilometer to achieve the equilibrium of demand and supply, respectively. That is, when the cruising taxis have an advantage over the ride-hailing taxis, the price of cruising taxis should be raised to gain more benefits. Instead, the cruising taxis price should be decreased to improve their competitiveness.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic pricing model for cruising taxicab based on system dynamics

Jin

Liu

et al. 2019

Advances in Mechanical Engineering

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Research on Local Government Governance and Enterprise Social Responsibility Behaviors under the Perspective of Cournot Duopoly Competition: Analyzing Taxi Companies and Online Car-Hailing Service Companies

Zhang

2018

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Clarifying the rational choice strategy of local governments and enterprises is crucial for promoting control on the failure of taxis and online car-hailing service companies to fulfill their social responsibilities. The local government can reduce the negative externalities and irresponsibility of such companies by improving the regulatory system; thus, it is important to build a governance model that bridges tradition and modernity. This paper, on the basis of summarizing the achievements of the predecessors, builds a mixed dynamic game model among the local government, online car-hailing service companies, and taxi companies; analyzes the relationship between local government preference, execution, and governance of irresponsible enterprise behaviors; and analyzes the equilibrium solution between local government and duopoly enterprises behavior game deeply. The results show that the key to governance irresponsible companies is to make the punishment cost higher than the cost savings for irresponsible behaviors; no matter what the preference of the local government no-governance of online car-hailing service companies' irresponsible behaviors may persist; and local government ambivalence when regulating irresponsible companies is derived from the complex relationship between social benefits and company interests. Finally, through the analysis of the equilibrium results for the above model, this paper provides suggestions on regulatory policies so as to provide theoretical support and a decision-making basis for establishing scientific, universal, and feasible governance policies and offering responsible methods of urban transportation.

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Duopoly Competition Between Chauffeured Car and Taxi: An Analysis of Pricing and Market Segmentation

Cited by 2 publications

References 11 publications

Dynamic pricing model for cruising taxicab based on system dynamics

Dynamic pricing model for cruising taxicab based on system dynamics

Research on Local Government Governance and Enterprise Social Responsibility Behaviors under the Perspective of Cournot Duopoly Competition: Analyzing Taxi Companies and Online Car-Hailing Service Companies

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