Research on Local Government Governance and Enterprise Social Responsibility Behaviors under the Perspective of Cournot Duopoly Competition: Analyzing Taxi Companies and Online Car-Hailing Service Companies

Abstract

Clarifying the rational choice strategy of local governments and enterprises is crucial for promoting control on the failure of taxis and online car-hailing service companies to fulfill their social responsibilities. The local government can reduce the negative externalities and irresponsibility of such companies by improving the regulatory system; thus, it is important to build a governance model that bridges tradition and modernity. This paper, on the basis of summarizing the achievements of the predecessors, builds a mixed dynamic game model among the local government, online car-hailing service companies, and taxi companies; analyzes the relationship between local government preference, execution, and governance of irresponsible enterprise behaviors; and analyzes the equilibrium solution between local government and duopoly enterprises behavior game deeply. The results show that the key to governance irresponsible companies is to make the punishment cost higher than the cost savings for irresponsible behaviors; no matter what the preference of the local government no-governance of online car-hailing service companies' irresponsible behaviors may persist; and local government ambivalence when regulating irresponsible companies is derived from the complex relationship between social benefits and company interests. Finally, through the analysis of the equilibrium results for the above model, this paper provides suggestions on regulatory policies so as to provide theoretical support and a decision-making basis for establishing scientific, universal, and feasible governance policies and offering responsible methods of urban transportation.

Analysis of the Mechanism of Political Cost in the Complex Environmental Governance System

“…erefore, it is necessary to explore the appropriate path to internalize the externalities of environmental governance to solve the problem, such as using the environmental tax paid for pollution regulation and treatment, transferring funds to reward enterprises that actively reduce emissions to improve pollution reduction equipment, reducing the overall tax burden of enterprises, building a complete environmental monitoring system and monitoring intelligence information system, and forming an interactive and circular chain of "enterprise subsidies-technological innovation-improve total factor productivity-economic growth-drive local governments to increase investment in environmental management." It is necessary to increase public perception of environmental governance to determine the level of subsidies, improve public psychological intervention mechanisms, and enhance rational public perceptions of"environmental governance" through various channels and platforms, such as official media and social organizations, while correcting public bias and beliefs and promoting value recognition and public psychological gain [75]. It is also important to develop cross-organizational cooperation to broaden public participation channels, reasonably design the form of participation, efficiently address public letters, visits, and complaints, and reduce the cost of public participation.…”

A System Dynamics Model for Safety Supervision of Online Car-Hailing From an Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

“…Strengthening the supervision and management through policies or rules is an important guarantee for the safe operation of the online car-hailing service [17]- [20]. Based on the analysis of the technical means to realize the safety operation [21]- [24], the establishment of a better sharing system is regarded as the key to solve the problem of the safety operation of online car-hailing service and an effective strategy to ensure the safety supervision [25]- [28].…”

“…where s 21 , s 22 , t 21 and t 22 are respectively the coefficients of penalty given by the government supervision departments to the online hailed car owners and the platforms; x 21 , x 22 , y 21 and y 22 are respectively the coefficients of incentive given by the government supervision departments to the online hailed car owners and the platforms; and assuming that they are all 1, the SD model of the evolutionary game of the safety supervision under the dynamic penalty-incentive control measures is as shown in Fig. 6.…”

Online Car-Hailing System Performance Analysis Based on Bayesian Network

“…Xu et al [17] determine the factors affecting the taxi driver's response to the service requests of online car-hailing from the perspective of the taxi driver. In addition, some scholars have focused mainly on the development of the online car-hailing platform, the rise of the online car-hailing platform [18], [19], its operational characteristics [20], environmental protection [21], government supervision [22], bilateral matching algorithm [23], [24] and other aspects.…”