Duration judgment and the experience of change

Abstract

Predictions based on storage size, processing effort, and change models of time estimation were tested in five experiments. The first of these presented subjects with stimulus patterns that varied on dimensions of sensory-event number and uncertainty. Subjects estimated the duration of time periods using the reproduction method. Duration estimates were most accurately predicted by the number of sensory events in each pattern. This relationship was generally positive, although the specific function relating these variables was dependent upon clock duration. The change model seemed to fit these data best. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the relationship between sensory change and judged duration was not due to the total time of sensory input. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 tested the effects of several different types of change. In Experiments 3 and 4, the number C1f sensory events was held constant, but the regularity of their spatial presentation was varied. In both experiments, duration judgments were positively related to the number of changes that occurred. Because the manipulations used in these experiments produced differences in the visual complexity of stimulus patterns, the argument could be made that storage size or processing effort accounted for the size of duration judgments. Experiment 5 tested the effects of change while holding the visual complexity of stimulus patterns constant. A positive relationship between duration judgments and number of changes was again found. 548Given the ubiquity of man-made clocks in modern societies, it seems clear that humans frequently rely on nonorganismic mechanisms to measure the temporal extent of events. Apart from these timekeeping devices, however, we still experience something metaphorically referred to as "time passage," and can also generate estimates of duration using organismic processes. Although time perception has been the topic of scientific investigation for at least 90 years, a clear understanding of the psychological mechanisms of duration estimation is still forthcoming.Some of the earliest researchers proposed that the experience of duration was based on the output of a biological clock (e.g., Francois, 1927;Hoagland, 1933). Recent models have emphasized the role of cognitive activity rather than metabolic functioning. This cognitive approach has the advantage of being able to explain why the quantity of stimulus information in an interval of clock time can affect its apparent duration. When increasesThe manuscript is based on the first author's doctoral dissertation. Reprint requests should be addressed to W. Douglas

Time, change, and motion: The effects of stimulus movement on temporal perception

“…Moderate numbers of targets were related to longer temporal productions, but only for the 6-sec stationary displays. A similar pattern has been observed elsewhere (Poynter & Homa, 1983), and this effect will be considered in more detail in the general discussion section.…”

“…An alternative approach, advanced by a number of theorists, emphasizes the role of stimulus change in time perception (e.g., Block, 1982Block, , 1990Fraisse, 1963Fraisse, , 1978Gibson, 1975;Poynter & Homa, 1983). According to this view, changes in stimulus events lengthen the experience of time because "change is the psychological index of time passage" (Poynter, 1989, p. 309).…”

On symbolic temporal information: Beliefs about the experience of duration

“…They observed, among other things, that a time interval seems to pass more slowly if it contains an unpleasant (as opposed to a pleasant) task, a task in which a person has little to do (as opposedto one in which the person is busy), a single task (as opposed to several different tasks), a task that takes place in an unchanging (as opposed to a changing) environment, and a task that is easy (as opposedto challenging). This correspondswell to results on actual duration judgments, indicatingthat intervals with unpleasant stimuli (e.g., Harton, 1939;Langer et al, 1961), many stimuli (e.g., Buffardi, 1971;Ornstein, 1969), variable .stimuli (e.g., Block & Reed, 1978;Poynter, 1983;Poynter & Homa, 1983), and difficult stimuli (e.g., Burnside, 1971;Hicks et al, 1976;Zakay, Nitzan, & Glicksohn, 1983) are judged to be longer than intervals with neutral or pleasant, few, less variable (i.e., more monotonous), and easy stimuli.…”

“…Severalof these variables (facets) are related to judgments on the duration of intervals (Galinat, 1984): (1) numberof stimuliperceivedduring a given interval (e.g., Buffardi, 1971;Frankenhauser, 1959;Mo, 1971;Ornstein, 1969); (2) amount of memory space required to store the events (e.g., Mulligan & Schiffman, 1979;Ornstein, 1969;Schiffman& Bobko, 1974, 1977; (3) difficulty (i.e., processing demands of the stimuli) DURAnON BELIEFS 309 (e.g., Avant, Lyman, & Antes, 1975;Burnside, 1971;Hicks et al, 1976;Michon, 1965;Thomas & Weaver, 1975;Vroon, 1970); (4) variability (i.e., the number of perceived changes of the stimuli) (Block & Reed, 1978;Fraisse, 1963;Poynter, 1983;Poynter & Homa, 1983); (5) evaluation (i.e., the perceived pleasantnessof stimuli (e.g., Edmonds, Cahoon, & Bridges, 1981;Harton, 1939;Langer, Wapner, & Werner, 1%1;Rosenzweig& Koht, 1933); (6) degree of anticipatory tension toward the occurrence of an event (e.g., Block, George, & Reed, 1980;Lordahl & Berkowitz, 1975); (7) attentional selectivity during encoding and retrieving of the stimuli (Underwood, 1975;Underwood & Swain, 1973) or attentional focusing on the passage oftime itself (e.g., Curton & Lordahl, 1974;Fraisse, 1963;McKay, 1977). Other researchers have presented somewhat different lists of facets.…”

Duration discrimination of filled and empty auditory intervals: Cognitive and perceptual factors

“…These predictions were inspired by studies that have shown that increasing the amount of stimulus information within an interval while duration is held constant can strongly influence subjects' judgments of duration. Three major theories of these findings have emerged: the storage size model (Block, 1974;Mulligan & Schiffman, 1979;Ornstein, 1969), the processing effort model (Avant, Lyman, & Antes, 1975;Fraisse, 1979;Thomas & Weaver, 1975), and the change model (Block & Reed, 1978;Poynter & Homa, 1983). All these models posit that duration judgment is cognitively mediated.…”