Duration judgment and the segmentation of experience

Abstract

Two experiments tested an interval segmentation explanation of duration judgment. In Experiment 1, a 170-sec time interval was filled with 27 unrelated words and three highpriority events (HPEs). These HPEs were clustered at the beginning of the interval (unsegmented condition) or distributed throughout the interval (segmented condition). Both recognition and recall of list information were measured, in addition to duration estimates. While no differences in memory performance were found, duration estimates were greater in the the segmented condition. Experiment 2 also tested the effects of interval segmentation but used 35 words and eight HPEs, a longer clock duration, and also measured the remembered number of events (RNE) in the interval. As in Experiment 1, the segmented condition produced longer duration estimates in the absence of memory performance and RNE differences. A segmentation hypothesis seems a better explanation of these results than previously proposed storage size or amount-of-processing models of duration judgment.Researchers who examine factors affecting psychological duration frequently demonstrate that periods that are "filled" with stimuli are judged to be longer than intervals that are relatively "empty." The "storage size" hypothesis (Ornstein, 1969) is one possible explanation for this phenomenon. According to this metaphor, retrospective duration estimates are based on the quantity of information stored du ring the period and accessible when the duration judgment is made. Other investigators have emphasized the amount of processing or the level of attention required by interval events (Underwood, 1975;Vroon, 1970). The relationship between these variables and time estimates is not always consistent, however. Vroon (1970) has demonstrated that the relationship between amount of processing and duration judgments can be negative or positive, depending upon whether overt responses are required. Regarding the storage size notion, Avant and Lyman (1975) and Block and Reed (1978) have demonstrated differences in judged duration that either are not related or are inversely related to measures of subjects' memory for interval events.The effect of filler events on estimates of duration could also be explained by proposing that fillers are temporal markers that serve to segment experience; a filled interval might therefore seem longer than an empty one, not because of the amount of processing or storage space the intervening events require, but because processing these events generates temporal referents in memory with which to mentally reconstruct the duration of the time period. A very similar notion that focuses on the amount of change experienced du ring the judged interval has recently been proposed and studied by Block and Reed (1978). These experiments dem onstrated that time periods during which subjects performed alternating types of processing were perceived as 77 longer than those during which a single type of processing was performed. These results were interpreted as supporting the...

Routine and the Perception of Time.

“…However, Study 1 demonstrated that when the number of segments was augmented and repeated evenly, creating a routine, automatic feeling, the opposite occurred. Thus, whereas Poynter (1983) and Zakay et al (1994) found that the high-segmentation condition yielded longer time duration judgments than the low-segmentation condition in a nonroutine order of the segments, here the high-segmentation-routine condition yielded shorter time duration judgments than the highsegmentation-nonroutine condition and also the shortest time estimations of all the conditions. Hence, instead of the segments creating a change and becoming anchors to retrieve from memory, thus making duration seem longer, their automatic nature apparently created a unity that made time duration seem shorter.…”

“…In past research on retrospective time estimations, a higher level of segmentation led to longer judgments of duration (Poynter, 1983;Poynter & Homa, 1983;Zakay & Feldman, 1993). Block (1978Block ( , 1989 related duration estimates with the number of changes.…”

“…Study 1 followed previous studies (Poynter, 1983;Zakay et al, 1994) that showed how segmentation of an interval produced longer judgments of duration. However, Study 1 demonstrated that when the number of segments was augmented and repeated evenly, creating a routine, automatic feeling, the opposite occurred.…”

How do changes in speed affect the perception of duration?

“…The first class assumes that duration is a by-product of non-temporal information processing; there is no specialized "timer" for measuring duration. For example, Ornstein (1969) argued that perceived duration depends upon the space needed to store the stimulus in memory, and others have stressed that time perception depends on the number of changes taking place during an interval (e.g., Block & Reed, 1978;Poynter, 1983). These storage-or change-based models have typically been applied to retrospective time judgments -where the participant does not know in advance that they will be asked for a time estimate -but they have also been related to the effects of stimulus motion on time perception in prospective tasks, where the observer knows that a time judgment will be required: More complex motion patterns are taken to lengthen apparent duration (Aubry, Guillaume, Mogicato, Bergeret, & Celsis, 2008) and faster speeds are taken to entail greater positional change and, accordingly, longer subjective time (S. W. Brown, 1995;Poynter, 1989).…”

On symbolic temporal information: Beliefs about the experience of duration

“…Severalof these variables (facets) are related to judgments on the duration of intervals (Galinat, 1984): (1) numberof stimuliperceivedduring a given interval (e.g., Buffardi, 1971;Frankenhauser, 1959;Mo, 1971;Ornstein, 1969); (2) amount of memory space required to store the events (e.g., Mulligan & Schiffman, 1979;Ornstein, 1969;Schiffman& Bobko, 1974, 1977; (3) difficulty (i.e., processing demands of the stimuli) DURAnON BELIEFS 309 (e.g., Avant, Lyman, & Antes, 1975;Burnside, 1971;Hicks et al, 1976;Michon, 1965;Thomas & Weaver, 1975;Vroon, 1970); (4) variability (i.e., the number of perceived changes of the stimuli) (Block & Reed, 1978;Fraisse, 1963;Poynter, 1983;Poynter & Homa, 1983); (5) evaluation (i.e., the perceived pleasantnessof stimuli (e.g., Edmonds, Cahoon, & Bridges, 1981;Harton, 1939;Langer, Wapner, & Werner, 1%1;Rosenzweig& Koht, 1933); (6) degree of anticipatory tension toward the occurrence of an event (e.g., Block, George, & Reed, 1980;Lordahl & Berkowitz, 1975); (7) attentional selectivity during encoding and retrieving of the stimuli (Underwood, 1975;Underwood & Swain, 1973) or attentional focusing on the passage oftime itself (e.g., Curton & Lordahl, 1974;Fraisse, 1963;McKay, 1977). Other researchers have presented somewhat different lists of facets.…”