Dyadic Representation in a Westminster System

Abstract

Additional information: Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Dyadic Representation in a Westminster SystemIs policy representation in contemporary Westminster systems solely a function of programmatic national parties, or does the election of legislators via single-member districts result in MPs whose policy positions are individually responsive to public opinion in their constituencies? We generate new measures of constituency opinion in Britain and show that, in three different policy domains and controlling for MP party, the observed legislative behavior of MPs is indeed responsive to constituency opinion. The level of responsiveness is moderate, but our results do suggest a constituency-MP policy bond that operates in addition to the well-known bond between voters and parties.

Representation in Wales: An empirical analysis of policy divisions between voters and candidates

“…Costello et al 2012;Leimgruber et al 2010;Reher 2015;Teperoglou et al 2014). Other data have of course been used as well as some scholars have instead opted for party or government positions (e.g., Golder and Stramski 2010;Hakhverdian 2010;Huber and Powell 1994;Powell 2009) and others for the positions of elected parliamentarians (e.g., Hanretty et al 2017;Karyotis et al 2014;Vasilopoulou and Gattermann 2013 viii Responses that did not fall under these categories were omitted from the analysis. They constituted less than 10% of the total responses.…”

Economic Decline and Extreme‐Right Electoral Threat: How District‐Level Factors Shape the Legislative Debate on Immigration

“…This type of dyadic representation has been studied most thoroughly in the candidate‐centered system of the United States (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart ; Krimmel, Lax, and Phillips ), and recently in the United Kingdom (Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan ). But in strong party systems such as the Swedish, some research suggests that district‐level congruence is manifested via MPs’ parliamentary questions, speeches, and bill cosponsorship (Baumann, Debus, and Müller ; Fernandes, Leston‐Bandeira, and Schwemmer ).…”

“…Our research builds on this literature but goes beyond the party as a unified actor approach. Specifically, we analyze the degree to which MPs, rather than parties, respond to district constituencies (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart ; Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan ; Krimmel, Lax, and Phillips ). Similar to Herzog and Benoit (), who analyze legislators’ rhetoric and correspondence with district conditions, we test whether district‐level socioeconomic changes correlate with MPs’ language.…”

Submissive Lobby Fodder or Assertive Political Actors? Party Loyalty of Career Politicians in the UK House of Commons, 2005–15

“…Because no party line is prescribed in these cases, strategic considerations play a more limited role. 27 As a result, choices in free votes give a better indication of true preferences compared to whipped votes (e.g., Baumann, Debus, and M€ uller 2015;Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan 2016;Spirling and McLean 2006). Rerunning the main models only on unwhipped divisions reveals that career and non-career politicians do not differ in their likelihood to vote with the ideological minority of their party in free votes (see Table A1 in the online supporting information).…”

“…Beyond its topical relevance, this study contributes to the academic literature seeking to explain MP-level variation of party loyalty in parliamentary systems (e.g., Benedetto and Hix 2007;Cowley and Childs 2003;Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan 2016;Kam 2006Kam , 2009Sieberer 2010;Tavits 2009). It is thereby also contextualized by a fastgrowing wave of MP-level work asking how individual characteristics or socioeconomic background such as gender, ethnicity, local political experience, or religious denomination can help explain MP-level variation within various legislative activities (e.g., B€ ack, Debus, and M€ uller 2014;Baumann, Debus, and M€ uller 2015;Cowley and Childs 2003;Saalfeld 2011;Tavits 2009).…”